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Abstract 
 
Employers are turning towards health plans with limited provider networks to combat 
increasing health care costs. Some new enrollees of these plans will switch their usual 
primary care providers due to network restrictions leading to interruptions in continuity-
of-care and potentially higher medical expenditures and/or lower quality care when 
compared to enrollees whose providers remain in-network. In this study, I analyzed the 
effects of switching primary care clinics on costs, utilization, and quality of care after 
enrollment in a limited network plan. The study setting was the employee benefits plan of 
the University of Minnesota, where after changes to the menu of its health plans in 2012, 
4% (1,151 of 26,345) of covered adult lives enrolled in a limited network plan and 
subsequently switched primary care clinics. I answered three questions pertaining to 
enrollment in the limited network plan: 1) did individuals who switched primary care 
clinics have higher costs or more utilization compared to individuals who kept their 
clinics 2) did individuals who switched clinics switch to higher or lower quality clinics, 
and 3) what were the associations between clinic attributes and the clinic choices of 
enrollees who switched clinics? Switching primary care clinics was not associated with 
an increase in expenditures or the probabilities of having a hospitalization or an 
emergency department visit. However, switching primary care clinics was associated 
with approximately 1 additional primary care visit in the following year for enrollees in 
the sickest health risk quartile and approximately 0.5 fewer specialty care visits for 
enrollees in the three sickest health risk quartiles. The decreased utilization of specialty 
care is a potential negative implication of limited network plans as patients can receive 
higher quality care from specialty care providers on some conditions including diabetes 
and asthma. Furthermore, enrollees who switched primary care clinics obtained care at 
clinics with lower performance on clinical and behavioral quality as well as patient 
experience than if they had been able to keep their previous clinics. However, these 
differences were relatively small, with the exception of a 5.4 percentage point decrease in 
performance regarding patients’ satisfaction with timeliness of care. Of enrollees who 
switched primary care clinics, distance, payor mix, and the percent of specialty 
physicians had the largest effects on their choices. Quality had little association with 
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primary care clinic choice. Given that the primary care clinic exclusions of the limited 
network plan did not have a substantial impact on the average performance of clinics 
available, these results suggest that enrollees did not emphasize quality of care when 
choosing primary care clinics. Overall, these results imply that employers offering 
limited network plans may be unlikely to face higher financial costs associated with 
enrollees switching primary care providers, although for individuals who would have to 
switch clinics, enrollment may not be appropriate if they are in need of timely specialty 
care.  
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1. Introduction 
 
 
Despite the backlash employers faced in the late 1990s by steering their employees into 
restrictive managed care plans, employers are once again turning towards health plans 
with limited, or narrow, provider1 networks to combat increasing plan costs (Kaiser 
Family Fondation/Health Research and Education Trust (KFF/HRET) 2015). In a survey 
of 595 employers with at least 1,000 employees, 18% offered at least one limited network 
plan in 2014 with a 2 percentage point increase predicted for 2015 (Tower Watson 2014). 
These plans are highly attractive to employers, who rein in costs by restricting enrollees’ 
access to high-cost specialty care providers and hospitals (Gruber and McKnight 2016; 
Lo Sasso and Atwood 2015). The exclusion of entire health systems and physician 
practices also eliminates primary care providers from networks. Thus, the re-introduction 
of limited network plans places some individuals in the dilemma of choosing either a 
lower cost, limited network plan and losing in-network access to their usual primary care 
providers or selecting a higher cost, broad network plan. Given consumers’ price-
sensitivity to plan premiums (Strombom, Buchmueller, and Feldstein 2002), many 
consumers are opting for lower premiums over provider choice (Peters and Holahan 
2014). 
 
Individuals who elect to enroll in limited network plans and who must switch primary 
care providers may have higher medical expenditures and/or receive lower quality care, 
at least compared to enrollees whose primary care providers remain in-network. A recent 
study by Gruber and McKnight (2016) examining Massachusetts state employees 
enrolled in limited network plans found that while enrollment in a limited network plan 
decreased expenditures, the savings was accrued only by enrollees who kept their 
primary care physicians. One plausible reason for this result is that switching primary 
care providers interrupts continuity-of-care. Because primary care providers often are 
responsible for referrals to specialty care providers and hospitals, switching primary care 
providers may have continuity-of-care implications for primary and non-primary care 																																																								
1 I use provider as a catch-all term for any source of health care including individual clinicians and 
practitioners, physicians practices, hospitals, clinics, and any other location or individual providing care. 
		 2 
settings. Disruptions of continuity-of-care are linked to higher costs stemming from 
increased outpatient, hospital, and emergency department (ED) utilization (Saultz and 
Lochner 2005; van Walraven et al. 2010). Similarly, discontinuous care may lead to 
worse clinical outcomes, such as meeting a specific HbA1c goal for individuals with 
diabetes (Mainous et al. 2004; Parchman et al. 2002). Aside from continuity-of-care 
arguments, limited network plan enrollees who switch primary care providers may 
receive lower quality of care because they switch to relatively low-quality providers, 
either due to network exclusions of high-quality providers or enrollees selecting new 
providers based on considerations other than quality.  
 
The effects of switching primary care providers for sicker patients are of particular 
concern, because they have the most to gain from sustained primary care provider 
relationships and receiving care at the highest quality providers (Bodenheimer 2008; 
Nutting et al. 2003). Although high-risk individuals are less likely to enroll in limited 
network plans when given a choice, individuals of all health risk levels are sensitive to 
plan premiums (Strombom, Buchmueller, and Feldstein 2002), suggesting some high-risk 
individuals do enroll in limited network plans.  
 
In this study, I analyzed the effects of switching primary care clinics on costs, utilization, 
and quality of care after enrollment in a limited2 network plan. A primary care clinic is a 
single site location that is generally freestanding or a primary care department within a 
hospital. These clinics can be thought of as usual sources of care. Literature suggests that 
variation in costs, utilization, and quality are primarily determined by the location of care 
and not individual physicians, particularly for medically complex patients such as 
patients with chronic conditions (Hueston 2010; Mainous et al. 2004). I also analyzed the 
primary care clinic choices for individuals who switched primary care clinics in order to 
understand the relative associations between clinic attributes, including quality, and clinic 
choices.  
																																																								
2 There is no agreed upon definition of a limited, or narrow, network. For the study, the limited network 
plan simply excluded a subset of the providers offered in the other plans available to the study population. 
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The study setting for this analysis was the employee benefits plan of the University of 
Minnesota, where after changes to the menu of its health plans offered to employees in 
2012, 4% (1,151 of 26,345) of covered adult lives enrolled in a limited network plan and 
subsequently switched primary care clinics. To reduce costs after a substantial state 
funding cut, the university dropped a traditional, broad network plan administered by 
HealthPartners (Bloomington, Minnesota). Fifty-eight percent of the former 
HealthPartners plan enrollees (5,470 of 9,452) selected a limited network plan that 
excluded the majority of the heavily utilized HealthPartners health system (including the 
exclusion of 18 of 26 primary care clinics). Of the new enrollees of the limited network 
plan, 20% (1,151 of 5,470) switched to a new primary care clinic due to network 
restrictions (i.e. their former clinic was out-of-network in the new plan). Using the 
population of the new limited network plan enrollees I answered the following questions 
regarding switching primary care clinics: 
 
1) Did individuals who switched primary care clinics have higher costs (total, 
outpatient, prescription drug, inpatient, and ED) or more utilization 
(hospitalizations, ED visits, primary care provider visits, and specialty care 
provider visits) compared to individuals who kept their clinics? 
 
2) Did individuals who switched primary care clinics switch to higher or lower 
quality clinics as measured by publicly reported clinical and behavioral 
performance as well as patient experience measures?  
 
3) What were the associations between clinics’ attributes, including quality, and the 
clinic choices of enrollees who switched primary care clinics? 
 
I employed a longitudinal difference-in-differences analysis for Aim 1. I compared 
individuals who enrolled in the limited network plan and subsequently switched primary 
care clinics from 2011 to 2012 due to network restrictions to individuals who kept their 
clinic because their 2011 clinic was included in the limited network plan. In Aim 2, I 
compared the performance of enrollees’ new primary care clinics to the performance of 
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their former clinics using public reports. For both Aim 1 and Aim 2, I examined the 
moderating effect of health risk. Of the individuals who enrolled in the limited network 
plan, 23% belonged to the least healthy quartile of university enrollees across all health 
plans, indicating that sicker individuals did enroll in the limited network plan. I obtained 
2008 through 2012 medical claims and eligibility files from the University of Minnesota 
Office of Human Resources. These data permitted me to estimate the effect of switching 
primary care clinics on a number of measures pertaining to costs and utilization. In 
addition, the inclusion of International Classification of Disease Revision 9 (ICD-9) 
codes and medication prescriptions allowed me to examine differences in the effect of 
switching primary care clinics by health risk. During the time frame of this study, 
Minnesota Community Measurement (MNCM) published performance on several quality 
measures for most primary care clinics in Minnesota as well as some clinic in bordering 
states. I used measures pertaining to diabetes care (2007-2012), vascular disease care 
(2008-2012), and patient experience (2012) to determine if enrollees switched to primary 
care clinics of higher or lower quality relative to their original clinics. Lastly, in Aim 3, I 
developed a discrete choice model to describe the attributes of the primary care clinics 
chosen by enrollees who switched clinics in order to understand the relative magnitudes 
of the associations between clinic choices and clinic attributes including quality, distance, 
and physician mix. 
 
I found that switching primary care clinics was not associated with an increase in 
expenditures of any type or the probabilities of having a hospitalization or ED visit after 
enrollment in the limited network plan. This result implies that employers offering 
limited network plans may be unlikely to face higher financial costs associated with some 
enrollees switching primary care providers. However, switching primary care clinics was 
associated with differences in the amounts of primary care and specialty care provider 
visits. My results indicate that for enrollees in the sickest health risk quartile, switching 
primary care clinics was associated with, on average, 1.01 (95% Confidence Interval 
(CI): 0.08 to 1.95) additional visits with primary care providers in the following year 
compared to enrollees who did not switch clinics. In addition, enrollees in the three 
sickest health risk quartiles who switched primary care clinics experienced a decrease in 
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visits with specialty care providers (0.50 (95% CI: -0.23 to 1.23) for the sickest quartile, 
0.49 (95% CI: -0.10 to 1.08) for the second sickest quartile and 0.77 (95% CI: 0.46 to 
1.07) for the third sickest quartile) compared to enrollees who did not switch clinics. 
These changes occurred in the first half of the year after switching primary care clinics 
and persisted when controlling for each clinic’s health system and performance on 
clinical and behavioral quality, suggesting that the effects were tied to continuity-of-care 
disruptions rather than to switching to clinics of different quality or practice style.   
 
The decreased utilization of specialty care providers by enrollees who switched primary 
care clinics is a potential negative implication of limited network plans. Three plausible 
mechanisms for this result are: 1) primary care providers are reluctant to refer some new 
patients to specialty care providers until after they have attempted to manage illnesses 
through primary care, 2) patients have difficulty in accessing the specialty care providers 
utilized by their new primary care providers, perhaps due to long wait times for 
appointments, and 3) patients wait to seek specialty care after losing access to their 
former providers. Through any of these mechanisms, this effect may have negative 
consequences for quality of care. Past research indicates that patients often receive higher 
quality care from specialty care providers for several conditions including diabetes 
(McAlister et al. 2007), asthma (Schatz et al. 2005; Vollmer et al.1997), and drug therapy 
for myocardial infarction (Ayanian et al. 1994). My regression results corroborate these 
studies, indicating that primary care clinics with better clinical performance for diabetes 
and vascular disease care employed more specialty care (0.014 visits per 1 percentage 
point increase in clinical performance (95% CI: 0.004 to 0.031)) and less primary care 
(0.03 visits per 1 percentage point increase in clinical performance (95% CI: 0.01 to 
0.05)). The decrease in visits in this study occurred across multiple specialties including 
oncology and surgery, which may have substantial health consequences. 
 
On average, enrollees who switched primary care clinics obtained care at clinics with 
lower performance on measures pertaining to clinical and behavioral quality as well as 
patient experience than if they had been able to keep their former clinics. However, these 
differences in performance were relatively small, with the exception of a 5.4 percentage 
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point average decrease in performance on patient satisfaction with timeliness of care3. Of 
enrollees who switched primary care clinics, distance, payor mix of patients at the clinic, 
and the percent of specialty care physicians had the strongest associations with clinic 
choices. The quality measures had little association with the primary care clinic choices. 
Given that the limited network enrollees had access to primary care clinics of similar 
quality to the excluded HealthPartners clinics, these results suggest that enrollees did not 
emphasize quality of care when choosing primary care clinics, perhaps because they were 
not well informed when making their selections.  
 
This study had limitations that constrain its scope and generalizability. First, I was 
limited to one employer in Minnesota and a single limited network plan. Minnesota is 
dominated by large, integrated delivery systems and is generally considered to be one the 
top-ranking states in terms of quality of care and integration (Moody and Silow-Carroll 
2009). Although a large, integrated health system was excluded in the limited network 
plan examined in this study, enrollees were still able to switch to new clinics in other 
large, integrated systems. This aspect may limit this study’s external validity when 
compared to areas with lower states of integration or limited network plans that have 
larger impacts on the type of providers and health systems enrollees can access in-
network.  However, recent trends have shown an increase in the rates of mergers and 
acquisitions throughout the U.S. leading to more vertically integrated health systems and 
concentrated markets (Baker, Bundorf, and Kessler 2014; Christianson, Carlin, and 
Warwick 2014). Furthermore, although the limited network plan only excluded the 
majority of one large, integrated delivery system, this type of exclusion is becoming more 
commonplace. In 2015, the Kaiser Family Foundation reported that 9% of employers 
(with 50 or more employees) had a hospital or health system dropped from a health plan 
(KFF/HRET 2015). For these reasons the experiences of the university are likely 
applicable to understanding the impact and appropriateness of limited network plans in 
other employer settings. A second major limitation of this study was the lack of 
individual outcome measures of quality or patient experience. While I found enrollees 																																																								
3 This measure was the percent of questions pertaining to receiving timely care answered with the most 
favorable rating by surveyed patients (conducted by MNCM). See Section 4.2. for a detailed explanation.  
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switched to lower quality primary care clinics, I was unable to determine if enrollees did 
in fact experience lower clinical quality or have worse satisfaction. Future studies 
examining individual quality measures, such as Hemoglobin A1c levels for patients with 
diabetes, will be valuable in determining the effects of provider switching and limited 
networks on enrollee well-being. 
 
In this study I estimated the effect of switching primary care clinics after enrollment in a 
limited network plan through the employee benefits plan of the University of Minnesota. 
My results suggest that switching primary care clinics was not associated with increased 
expenditures, hospitalizations, or ED visits. However, switching primary care clinics was 
associated with a decrease in specialty care provider visits, highlighting that the clinics 
had a large amount of control over care that occurred downstream from primary care 
providers. In addition, enrollees obtained care at primary care clinics with worse 
performance on publicly reported quality measures than if they had remained in their 
previous clinics, although these differences were relatively small. Overall, these results 
imply that for individuals who would have to switch primary care clinics, enrollment in a 
limited network plan may not be appropriate if they are in need of timely specialty care. 
This study supports the need to provide potential enrollees of limited network plans with 
information pertaining to the characteristics of available providers and the possible 
consequences of switching primary care providers in order to allow them to make well-
informed decisions. 	
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2. Background 
 
 
Despite consumer backlash over the growth of restrictive managed care plans in the late 
1990s, employers are once again increasingly offering health plans with limited provider 
networks to their employees. In search of lower premiums, many individuals are likely to 
select these plans even if doing so requires them to switch primary care providers. This 
provider switching may affect enrollees’ costs, utilization, and quality of care either via a 
disruption of continuity-of-care, potentially leading to negative consequences, or by 
switching to primary care providers of different quality or practice style. For the latter, it 
is unclear whether enrollees would receive care at primary care providers that are of 
higher or lower quality than their original providers because of limited quality 
information and poor consumer decision-making practices.  
 
 
2.1. Employer-based Limited Provider Network Plans  
 
Employers offering health plans with limited provider networks is not a new concept. The 
first major expansion of employer-based plans featuring selective contracting with 
providers is most prominently tied to the passing of the Health Maintenance Organization 
(HMO) Act of 1973 (Fox and Kongstvedt 2007). This act provided financial assistance to 
start and expand HMOs as well as required employers with at least 25 employees to 
include an HMO option if they were already offering health plans to their employees (42 
USC §300e et seq. 1973). HMOs and subsequent managed care plans, such as Preferred 
Provider Organization and Point-of-Service plans, aimed to lower health care costs 
(medical expenditures and health plan premiums) through several mechanisms including: 
actively managing a selective network of providers (while penalizing out-of-network 
utilization), using negotiating leverage to keep prices low, and employing utilization 
management activities to encourage providers to use less costly services (Christianson 
2014). Through the early 1990s, employers generally offered managed care plans 
alongside traditional, broad network plans, with their healthiest employees taking 
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advantage of the managed care plans’ lower premiums and sicker employees selecting the 
less restrictive network plans. 
 
Attempting to capitalize on the cost savings of managed care plans, employers 
increasingly stopped offering their employees broad network plans in the mid- and late 
1990s (Christianson 2014; Fox and Kongstvedt 2007). Doing so often left employees 
with little control over their health plan choices and forced employees who preferred 
broad network plans into the more restrictive managed care plans. Eventually this 
occurrence promoted backlash, as consumers grew to perceive managed care plans’ cost 
savings methods, including limits placed on provider choice, as merely means to increase 
profits rather than encourage high-value care (Kaiser Family Foundation 2000). These 
negative opinions of managed care plans coupled with economic growth in the late 
1990s, in which employers faced increased competition to attract and retain employees, 
led to a drop in consumer demand for managed care plans and employers opted to offer 
health plans with broader networks and less reliance on utilization management 
(Christianson, 2014).  
 
With continuing growth in health plan premiums throughout the last decade and weaker 
labor markets, employer and consumer demand has once again turned to health plans 
with restrictive provider networks in order to reduce health plan costs (KFF/HRET 2015; 
McKinsey and Company 2015). These new incarnations, commonly referred to as 
limited, narrow, or high-performance network plans do not always rely as heavily on 
utilization management as the preceding managed care plans, but they still restrict 
provider choices (Abelson 2016). In many cases they use provider networks smaller than 
traditional HMO plans (KFF/HRET 2015). These plans have been attractive to some 
employers because of their capacity to reduce utilization at high-cost hospitals and 
specialty care providers. (Gruber and McKnight 2016; Lo Sasso and Atwood 2015). In a 
survey of 595 employers with at least 1,000 employees, 18% offered at least one limited 
network plan in 2014 with a 2 percentage point increase predicted for 2015 (Tower 
Watson 2014). Similarly, 9% of employers (with 50 or more employees) offering health 
insurance reported that their insurer dropped a hospital or health system in 2015 to reduce 
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costs (KFF/HRET 2015) compared to 6% in 2014 (KFF/HRET 2014). Price-sensitive 
consumers are attracted to limited network plans because of their lower premiums 
(Gruber and McKnight 2016) and, in some instances, lower cost-sharing responsibilities 
compared to broad network plans. 
 
Some of the recent growth in limited network plans is likely tied to provisions in the 
Affordable Care Act of 2010 (ACA) that restrict insurers’ options for designing low-cost 
plans. The ACA removed limits on annual lifetime benefits as well as requires health 
plans to cover a set of Essential Health Benefits4 in small group markets (1 to 100 
employees) and to cover preventive services without any cost-sharing. These provisions 
intend to increase the value of health plans, but are costly for insurers to implement. 
Moreover, these regulations constrain how insurers can manipulate health plan design to 
offer low-cost plans. Network structure is one of the few options employers and insurers 
have that can have a significant impact on costs, in terms of medical payments and 
premiums. 
 
Outside of employer settings, limited network plans are widespread in the ACA 
Marketplaces. In 2014, 57% of Silver plans in the ACA Marketplaces, the most 
commonly selected plan-tier (Assistance Secreatry of for Planning and Evaluation 
(ASPE) 2016), included less than 40% of their market areas’ primary care physicians 
(Polsky and Weiner 2015). This circumstance is particular relevant for low-income 
families and individuals (with income at 100% to 250% of the federal poverty level) 
obtaining plans in the Marketplaces. Specifically, these enrollees can obtain both 
premium and cost-sharing subsidies with enrollment in Silver plans, which tend to have 
limited provider networks. Sixty-eight percent of all consumers (8.5 million people) who 
enrolled in a Marketplace plan during the 2016 open enrollment period selected a Silver 
plan (ASPE 2016).  																																																								4	Plans offered in individual and small group markets (1-100 employees) must cover the following benefits: 
(1) ambulatory patient services; (2) emergency services; (3) hospitalization; (4) maternity and newborn 
care; (5) mental health and substance use disorder services including behavioral health treatment; (6) 
prescription drugs; (7) rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices; (8) laboratory services; (9) 
preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management; and (10) pediatric services, including 
oral and vision care.	
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2.2. Effects of Switching Primary Care Providers 
 
Increased enrollment in limited network plans will undoubtedly lead some price-sensitive 
individuals to trade-off provider choice in exchange for lower premiums. Because these 
health plans often eliminate entire physician practices and health systems, some primary 
care providers are eliminated from networks (Polsky and Weiner 2015). Thus, some new 
enrollees in limited network plans will need to switch their primary care providers. 
Switching primary care providers may affect many aspects of patients’ care, as these 
providers are frequently responsible for disease management and care-coordination 
including referrals to specialty care providers and hospitals. Individuals who switch 
primary care providers may be at risk of having higher medical expenditures and/or 
receiving lower quality care, at least compared to limited network plan enrollees whose 
providers remain in-network, either due to continuity-of-care disruptions or by switching 
to lower quality providers. However, the literature explicitly studying primary provider 
switching is sparse. Although the growth in managed care plans throughout the 1970s to 
the 1990s saw many enrollees change their primary care providers (Davis et al. 1995), 
the managed care literature did not focus on the effects of switching providers apart from 
the other attributes of managed care (i.e. limited networks, benefit restrictions, utilization 
management, etc.). 
 
Gruber and McKnight (2016) present the most compelling evidence that switching 
primary care providers after enrollment in a limited network plan may increase costs and 
utilization in comparison to enrollees who keep their providers. The authors examined 
costs and utilization in limited network plans offered to Massachusetts state employees in 
2012. During their 2012 open enrollment period, the state offered a three-month premium 
holiday to encourage enrollment in limited network plans. New enrollees who took up 
the incentive subsequently had 36% lower medical costs on average, largely driven by 
reductions in visits with specialty care providers and less expensive hospitalizations. 
However, when the authors stratified their results by enrollees who kept their primary 
care physicians and enrollees whose original physicians were excluded in their limited 
network plan, they found that only enrollees who kept their physicians generated savings. 
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Enrollees who lost their primary care physicians had no significant decrease in spending 
or visits with specialty care providers with enrollment in a limited network plan.  
 
Although Gruber and McKnight (2016) offers insights into the potential effects of 
switching primary care providers after enrollment in a limited network plan, their 
analysis does have shortcomings. In particular, their setting may be atypical of the 
environment most employers would face when offering limited network plans, raising 
issues concerning the study’s generalizability. Foremost, their source of variation used to 
estimate changes in costs and utilization with enrollment in a limited network plan 
stemmed solely from the financial incentives that encouraged employees to switch plans. 
Unlike the experience of the University of Minnesota, none of the broad network plans 
offered to the Massachusetts state employees were dropped during the study, therefore all 
individuals could remain in the same health plan if they preferred it. Comparatively, 
many employers have dropped broad network plans and replaced them with more 
restrictive plans as they look for ways to cut costs (KFF/HRE 2015; Tower Watson 
2014), thus forcing employees to make active choices regarding their health plans and 
providers. In addition, the financial incentive created by the premium holiday was quite 
large, and combined with the lower premiums of the limited network plans, enrollees 
reduced their annual premiums by an average of 37%. This large financial incentive 
could have persuaded some individuals to enroll in the limited network plans, who would 
be unlikely to enroll in settings with smaller financial incentives (e.g. only the difference 
in annual premiums). Lastly, the authors did not examine differences by health risk or the 
quality of the new primary care providers as I propose in this study. Differential effects 
by health risk are likely because switching providers is potentially more detrimental for 
high-risk, complex patients who benefit more from continuous, high-quality care than 
low-risk patients. 
 
Two older, but relevant papers also studied primary care physician switching and its 
association with costs and utilization. However, in contrast to this study, neither paper 
examined switching that explicitly resulted from a change in health plan. Joffe et al. 
(1999) examined the effects of primary care physician switching on utilization for 
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children enrolled in Medicaid in New York. The authors found that primary care 
physician switching was associated with higher utilization through increases in 
emergency department (ED) and preventive care visits. A study by Weiss and Blustein 
(1996), using data on traditional Medicare enrollees, found that shorter physician-patient 
relationships were associated with higher costs and a higher likelihood of hospitalization 
compared to individuals with longer physician-patient relations. However, both studies 
suffer from methodological limitations that could bias their results. By using cross-
sectional data, neither can adequately control for the direction of causality between 
switching (or duration) and outcomes. Their results, which show higher costs and 
utilization when consumers leave their primary care physicians, could be due to sicker 
patients being more likely to switch physicians.  
 
The continuity-of-care literature gives further insight into the potential outcomes 
associated with switching primary care providers. The Institute of Medicine considers 
continuity-of-care to be a vital aspect of primary care (Donaldson et al.1996). By 
persistently utilizing the same physician or source of care over time, providers can learn 
about patients’ medical needs and empathize with their values regarding treatment 
options, potentially leading to more effective, efficient, and satisfying care (Starfield 
1992). Recent literature provides evidence in support of this knowledge accrual. Using 
answers to the Medicare Current Beneficiary Survey, Parchman and Burge (2003) found 
that longer physician-patient relationships were associated with better communication 
and physicians’ knowledge of their patients. Rodriguez et al. (2007) found similar results 
at a large multispecialty practice in Massachusetts and also showed that longer 
relationships were associated with better health promotion support and access to care. 
Continuity-of-care should benefit sicker patients more than relatively healthy patients, 
because complex medical conditions offer more potential for learning effective and 
efficient treatments (Bodenheimer 2008; Nutting et al. 2003). However, the increased use 
of limited network plans forces some enrollees to switch primary care providers, 
potentially squandering providers’ accrued knowledge about their patients. 
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It is important to note this literature does not explicitly study single switches from one 
assigned primary care provider to another, but rather indices of continuity (see Jee et al. 
2006 for examples) that measure how often an individual sees one provider relative to 
others over a defined time period. Although this concept is related to simply switching 
primary care providers, the concepts are not identical. For instance, the analyses 
presented in this study reflect a single break in patient’s relationships with primary care 
providers, while continuity-of-care indices also may reflect patients moving back and 
forth between multiple providers. 
 
Two literature reviews, van Walraven et al. (2010) and Saultz and Lochner (2005) 
provide concise summaries of the effects of continuity-of-care on measures of costs and 
utilization. In general, they conclude continuity-of-care is good for patients. The authors 
found that of 29 articles examining the relationship between continuity-of-care and 
measures of cost and utilization, only two failed to find a reduction in costs or utilization 
on at least one measure. Reduced hospitalizations and ED visits drove the decreases in 
costs and utilization, although two studies also found decreases in outpatient visits 
(Hennelly and Boxerman 1979; Raddish, Horn, and Sharkey 1999) and 3 studies found 
decreases in laboratory tests (Alpert et al. 1976; Heagarty et al.1970; Hjortdahl and 
Borchgrevink, 1991). Only one study found any increase in cost and utilization related to 
continuity-of-care. Hjortdalh and Borchgrevink (1991) found continuity-of-care was 
associated with increased prescription drug use and referrals to specialty care providers. 
In more recent work, Hussey et al. (2014) found continuity-of-care was associated with a 
lower total cost of care and a lower likelihood of having a hospitalization or ED visit for 
Medicare beneficiaries with congestive heart failure, chronic pulmonary disease, or type 
2 diabetes.  
 
The effect of continuity-of-care on health outcomes is mixed. Although the above 
summary highlights that continuity-of-care is associated with decreases in 
hospitalizations and ED visits, studies using clinical outcome measures have had 
conflicting results. For example, Mainous et al. (2004) and Parchamn et al. (2002) found 
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that continuity-of-care was associated with better glycemic control for individuals with 
diabetes, while Gulliford, Naithani, and Morgan (2007) found no such relationship.  
 
Both van Walraven et al. (2010) and Saultz and Lochner (2005) document weaknesses in 
the continuity-of-care literature. Like Joffe et al. (1999) and Weiss and Blustein (1996), 
the majority of the continuity-of-care literature is based on cross-sectional data. Both 
reviews state that the associations between continuity-of-care and measures of utilization, 
costs, and health outcomes are potentially driven by selection into which patients switch 
providers. If sicker patients are more likely to switch providers, then some of the results 
may be explained by unobserved differences in health between switchers and non-
switchers. In other words, individuals who switch providers may appear to have worse 
outcomes not because they switched but because they are persistently sicker than patients 
who remain with the same provider. 
 
Overall, the literature suggests that individuals who switch providers will have higher 
costs and utilization. These increases are mainly tied to higher likelihoods of 
hospitalizations and ED visits, and Joffe et al. (1999), Raddish et al. (1999), and Hennelly 
and Boxerman (1979) indicate that an increase in outpatient visits is also possible. The 
effect of provider switching on clinical outcomes is unclear. 
 
 
2.3. Primary Care Provider Choices and Quality of Care 
 
Enrollment in limited network plans may lead enrollees to seek care from low-quality 
primary care providers. Individuals who have to switch primary care providers may 
obtain care from relatively low-quality providers for two reasons: 1) insurers excluding 
high-quality providers and/or 2) enrollees selecting low-quality providers over high-
quality providers among in-network providers, either due to selecting providers on 
attributes other than quality or by chance due to a lack of comparative quality 
information.  
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Insurers often exclude one or more relatively high-quality health system(s) or hospital(s) 
from limited network plans (Shepard 2016). These exclusions are generally done to 
reduce utilization at high-cost specialty care providers and hospitals. For example, 
limited network plans tend to exclude academic medical centers (Richards 2013), which 
often are relatively high-quality, but also are costly compared to non-academic hospitals 
(Kupersmith 2005). Shepard (2016) explains that insurers also may exclude high-quality 
providers to avoid adverse selection into limited network plans, as sicker patients are 
more likely to seek out plans that include high-quality providers. Most of the evidence on 
provider exclusions concerns hospitals. Thus it is unknown if insurers ever specifically 
exclude high-cost, high-quality primary care providers. Likely, any exclusion of high-
quality primary care providers is a consequence of excluding entire physician practices 
and health systems. 
 
Even when high-quality primary care providers are present in limited network plans, 
enrollees may still select providers of relatively low-quality. Although individuals state 
that they place importance on quality of care when selecting providers, they often have 
difficulty choosing high-quality providers (Victoor et al. 2012). Many consumers are 
simply uninformed about the quality of potential providers when they make a decision. 
Although the use of provider report cards attempts to convey provider quality including 
patient experience, only a small fraction of individuals seek out this information and use 
it to make well-informed decisions (Damman et al. 2009). For example, in 2015, only 
24% of individuals with chronic conditions in Minnesota were aware of the publicly 
reported quality data for diabetes care and vascular disease care employed in this study 
(Scanlon et al. 2015). Furthermore, even when individuals are aware of quality report 
cards, many find that the available information is challenging to interpret, making it 
difficult to incorporate it into their decisions (Fasolo et al. 2010). 
 
Enrollees also may select low-quality primary care providers due to their lack of 
engagement in the provider market. As stated above, individuals are unlikely to seek out 
quality information regarding providers. They also rarely comparison shop for providers 
and typically stick with their initial choice, which could lead to poor matches (Damman 
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et al. 2009). Harris (2003) found that only 31% of individuals seriously consider 
alternative physicians before choosing a current provider. Similarly, Hoerger and 
Howard (1995) found that only 25% of pregnant women considered more than one pre-
natal physician and of those women, only 60% spoke with or visited two or more 
providers. Often individuals simply select the closest provider, which has particularly 
been the case for hospital care. Schwartz (2005) found that that only 10% of patients 
consider a non-local hospital. 
 
There are reasons to believe individuals would select high-quality primary care providers. 
While individuals are unlikely to use formal quality information, they do gather informal 
information from friends and families, physicians, and their own experiences (Victoor et 
al. 2012). Friends and family may suggest primary care providers who delivered 
satisfying care to them. Additionally, patients may receive recommendations from their 
former primary care providers before choosing their next provider. Lastly, individuals 
own positive experiences with specialists or hospitalists of still in-network health systems 
could influence them to choose a new primary care provider from those systems. 
 
Although the literature concludes that individuals are frequently disengaged, they may be 
more engaged when choosing a primary care provider compared to specialty care 
providers and hospitals. Much of the provider choice literature concerns choices of 
hospitals and specialty care providers, where patients may be apt to passively rely on 
referrals from their current providers rather than making their own well-informed 
decisions. However, choosing a new primary care provider may put individuals in a 
position with little information or guidance. Without information to go on, individuals 
may be more willing to seek out quality information.  
 
 
2.4. Needs of the Literature 
 
Research pertaining to primary care provider switching as well as the effects of current 
limited provider network plans is relatively sparse. Although Gruber and McKnight 
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(2016) offers insights into the possible consequences of switching primary care providers 
with enrollment in a limited network plan, their setting may be atypical of what many 
employers would face if they decided to offer more restrictive plans. In addition, the 
continuity-of-care literature has suffered from methodological limitations because of 
difficulty in controlling for selection into who switches providers. The employment of 
limited network plans, particularly when they replace broad network plans, offers 
opportunities to better study primary care provider switching because it functions as an 
exogenous shock forcing both individuals of good and poor health to make active choices 
about their health plan and providers. In addition, little is known about the consequences 
of enrollment in current limited network plans in general, likely due to the difficulty in 
obtaining data that include both plan choices and medical claims with provider choices, 
costs, and utilization. Information regarding the effect of limited networks health plans on 
costs and enrollees’ wellbeing will provide employers and policymakers with insights 
regarding how to optimally design these plans and when they are appropriate to offer. 
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3. Study Setting5 
 
 
The study setting for this analysis was the University of Minnesota health benefits plan 
from 2008 through 2012. The university health benefits plans covers approximately 
32,000 adult lives on an annual basis through a health insurance program commonly 
referred to as the ‘UPlan’. Through 2011, the UPlan offered health plans from 
HealthPartners (Bloomington, Minnesota) and Medica (Hopkins, Minnesota). Due to 
reduced funding from the state, the UPlan elected to utilize Medica as its sole health plan 
administrator beginning in 2012. Individuals previously enrolled in the HealthPartners 
plan could either switch to a Medica plan or forego health insurance coverage. One of 
these plans, Medica Elect/Essential (MEE) excluded the majority of providers from the 
HealthPartners health system. Enrollees who switched from the HealthPartners plan to 
the MEE plan, and had utilized now out-of-network HealthPartners primary care clinics, 
were therefore required to find a new clinic in 2012. This analysis follows the primary 
care clinic choices, costs, utilization, and quality of care for these enrollees in comparison 
to enrollees who did not switch clinics because they continuously utilized a clinic in the 
MEE plan’s network.  
 
The University of Minnesota offers an appropriate setting for this study and knowledge 
pertaining to its experiences is applicable to other employer settings for several reasons. 
First, the Twin Cities (i.e. Minneapolis and St. Paul), the main location of the university, 
is a highly consolidated market dominated by large, integrated delivery systems, a 
characteristic that is becoming more commonplace throughout urban areas of the U.S. 
(Christianson, Carlin, and Warwick 2014). Second, the university employs a broad and 
diverse workforce given its need to employee faculty, administrative and professional 
staff, and blue-collar workers. This feature of the university helps bolster this study’s 
external validity relative to research based on homogenous populations. Third, the limited 
																																																								
5 The institutional details in this chapter concerning the University of Minnesota’s UPlan and the health 
plans it offered are derived from the “2011 Open Enrollment Update & UPlan Changes: Calendar Year 
2012”, a presentation given by the University of Minnesota Office of Human Resources. Retrieved from: 
<https://www1.umn.edu/ohr/prod/groups/ohr/@pub/@ohr/documents/asset/ohr_asset_361472.pptx>	
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network plan in this study excluded a large, integrated health system, an exclusion that is 
increasingly occuring in employer-sponsored health plans.  
 
 
3.1. University of Minnesota UPlan Health Plans 
 
The University of Minnesota is a large, self-insured employer with five primary 
campuses including the Twin Cites (86% of adult covered-lives in 2011), Duluth (9%), 
Morris (2%), Crookston (1%), and Rochester (0.4%). During this study, the UPlan 
covered approximately 32,000 adults each year including employees, spouses, and 
dependents. From 2008 through 2011 the UPlan relied on two insurers, HealthPartners 
and Medica, to administer health plans. HealthPartners offered one health plan, which 
utilized a broad, regional provider network. The health plan was available to enrollees 
from all campuses and had the second largest enrollment of all plans, enrolling 36% of 
the UPlan population in 2011 (Table 3-1). In 2011, enrollees of this plan had slightly 
worse health compared to the full UPlan population as indicated by a health risk score6 of 
1.05 relative to 1.00 for the full population. Approximately half of the enrollees of the 
HealthPartners plan utilized primary care clinics within the HealthPartners health system. 
Medica offered five different health plans in 2011 with a variety premiums and cost-
sharing responsibilities (see Table 3-1 for details). An attribute of all but one of the 
Medica plans was the exclusion of the majority of HealthPartners providers (see Table 
A-1 for details). I classify these Medica plans as limited network plans because of these 
exclusions. The five Medica plans included: 
 
• Medica Elect/Essential: The base Medica plan for the Twin Cities and Duluth 
campuses. This health plan excluded 18 of 26 (69%) of HealthPartners primary 
care clinics and all specialty care clinics (except eye clinics). HealthPartners’ 
Minnesota hospital, Regions Hospital, was included. (38% of the UPlan 
population in 2011; health risk score = 0.87). 																																																								
6 The health risk score was created using the Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System algorithm 
using ICD-9 codes and medication prescriptions (retrevied from: http://cdps.ucsd.edu/). I indexed the risk 
scores such that mean health in the UPlan population is 1.00. Higher risk scores indicate worse health. 
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• Medica Choice National: A health plan available to all campuses featuring a 
national provider network. This plan excluded 14 of 26 (54%) of HealthPartners 
primary care clinics and all behavioral health clinics. Regions Hospital was 
included. (12% of the UPlan population in 2011; health risk score = 1.18). 
 
• Medica Choice Regional: The base Medica plan for campuses outside of the Twin 
Cities and Duluth. This health plan included the same HealthPartners providers as 
the Medica Choice National plan. (8% of the UPlan population in 2011; health 
risk score = 0.92). 
 
• Medica Choice Insights: A health plan available to all campuses featuring a 
tiered-provider network with increasing copayments by tier. This health plan 
included the entirety of the HealthPartners health system in the cheapest tier. (5% 
of the UPlan adult population in 2011; health risk score = 1.00). 
 
• Medica Health Savings Account: A high-deductible health plan available to all 
campuses. This health plan included the same HealthPartners providers as the 
Medica Choice National plan. (1% of the UPlan population in 2011; health risk 
score = 0.75). 
 
For the Medica plans in 2011, the majority of enrollees selected the MEE plan, which is 
the base plan for the Twin Cities and Duluth campus as well as the Media Choice 
Regional (MCR) plan, which is the base plan for all other campuses, respectively. A 
subset of, on average, sicker enrollees selected the Medica Choice National (MCN) plan, 
while very few enrollees selected the Medica Choice Insights (MCI) tiered-network plan 
or the high-deductible Medica Health Savings Account (MHSA) plan. 
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3.2. Decision to Drop the HealthPartners Health Plan  
 
Prior to 2012 open enrollment, the University of Minnesota was met with pressure to 
reduce the administrative costs of the UPlan. In 2011 the state reduced its funding to the 
University of Minnesota and due to these reductions the university required most 
departments to cut expenses by 5% including the UPlan insurance program. This cut 
required reduced costs of $12.7 million in 2012 by the UPlan and $11.4 million in 
subsequent years. The UPlan aimed to meet these cost reductions through two 
mechanisms: 1) pass on the costs of health insurance to employees by increasing 
premiums and co-payments and 2) selecting Medica as the sole health plan administrator 
and dropping coverage through HealthPartners (although access to HealthPartners 
providers would still be available in various degrees under the Medica plans). The UPlan 
anticipated that the latter would save over $14 million dollars between 2012 and 2017.  
 
It is important to note that in the tiered-network MCI plan HealthPartners is in the least 
expensive tier, suggesting that HealthPartners is not a high-cost health system. The 
university’s decision to drop the HealthPartners plan was primarily driven by the 
expected administrative savings of using only one insurer and by increasing enrollment in 
the limited network MEE plan, which had lower premiums than the HealthPartners plan. 
Therefore, enrollees who had been utilizing HealthPartners primary care providers 
potentially could have switched to providers with similar or even higher prices, which 
could bias the effects of switching clinics in this study when making comparisons to 
limited network plans that specifically exclude high-cost health systems. I discuss this 
point more thoroughly in the limitations portion of the discussion in Section 7.1.   
 
 
3.3. Selection of Health Plans by Former HealthPartners Plan Enrollees 
 
The decision to select Medica as the sole health plan administrator in the UPlan 
constrained the former HealthPartners enrollees to choose one of the Medica plans in 
2012. Enrollees who did not select a new plan during open enrollment received no 
medical coverage in 2012 (i.e. no automatic enrollment). Overwhelmingly, the former 
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HealthPartners enrollees selected either the limited network MEE plan (55% of former 
HealthPartners enrollees) or the tiered-network MCI plan (41%) in 2012 (Figure 3-1). 
Only 4% of former HealthPartners enrollees selected the MCR, MCN, or MHSA plans. 
 
Enrollees who selected a Medica plan other than the tiered-network MCI plan and who 
had been receiving primary care from a now out-of-network HealthPartners primary care 
clinic had to obtain care from a new in-network clinic, pay out-of-network fees, or choose 
to not receive care. Nearly all of the enrollees (99%) who switched primary care clinics 
were from the Twin Cities campus, as HealthPartners providers are not in the vicinity of 
the other campuses. In addition, the vast majority (95%) of enrollees who switched 
primary care clinics were new enrollees of the limited network MEE plan. Although the 
MCR and MCN health plans excluded HealthPartners primary care clinics, only 4% of 
former HealthPartners enrollees selected these plans and the majority of those enrollees 
were from campuses outside the Twin Cities. Therefore, this study focuses on primary 
care clinic switching by new enrollees of the limited network MEE plan from the Twin 
Cities campus.  
 
 
3.4. Primary Care Provider Network Changes 
 
The HealthPartners primary care clinics excluded in the limited network MEE plan are in 
general of average- to high-quality compared to other clinics in the Twin Cities area. 
Figure 3-2 presents the 2012 performance of primary care clinics in the Twin Cities area7 
utilized by UPlan enrollees and that reported to MNCM (refer to Table R-1 for 
summarized descriptions of each measure; detail descriptions are in Section 4.2.). The 
excluded HealthPartners primary care clinics best performances relative to all Twin 
Cities clinics were for clinical quality (Figure 3-2A) pertaining to diabetes care and 
vascular disease as well as timeliness of care (Figure 3-2C). Very few excluded 
HealthPartners primary care clinics fell into the bottom quartile of clinics on any 
performance measure. 																																																								
7 For Figure 3-2, the Twin Cities is defined by the following counties: Anoka, Dakota, Hennepin, Ramsey, 
and Washington. 
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Figure 3-2 highlights that while the limited network MEE plan excluded some high-
quality HealthPartners primary care clinics, a large number of high-quality clinics from 
other health systems remained as in-network options. This is not surprising, as Minnesota 
is dominated by large, integrated delivery systems (Christianson, Carlin, and Warrick 
2014). The state is generally considered to be one of the top-ranking states in terms of 
quality of care and integration (Moody and Silow-Carroll 2009). Given the number of 
primary care clinics in the Twin Cities (~180), excluding the HealthPartners clinics, even 
though they were of average- to high-quality, had little impact on the average quality of 
clinics within enrollees’ market areas8 (Table 3-2). 
 
It is important to note that MEE plan enrollees could continue to receive primary care 
within the HealthPartners health system if they switched to an in-network HealthPartners 
primary care clinic. However, all specialty care clinics (except eye care) were excluded 
from the MEE plan. The HealthPartners primary care clinics included in the MEE plan 
also were generally located on the periphery of the Twin Cities distant from the 
university. HealthPartners Health Center for Women and Regions Hospital, both in St. 
Paul, were exceptions. Therefore, MEE enrollees wishing to stay within the 
HealthPartners health systems likely would incur increased travel costs relative to 
switching to a closer in-network clinic. In rare cases, enrollees could obtain permission 
for a short-term continuation with an out-of-network provider (without paying out-of-
network fees) if they had received care from the provider in the previous 90 days for a 
serious and on-going medical condition (e.g. life-threatening acute care episode, 
pregnancy, etc.).  
 
 
3.5. External Validity of the University of Minnesota 
 
Using a single setting raises questions concerning the generalizability of this study. 
Foremost, the Twin Cities area is dominated by large, integrated delivery systems. This 
attribute could weaken generalizability to areas with less consolidation and/or integration. 																																																								
8 An urban (rural) enrollee’s market area is defined as 12.5-mile (17.5-mile) radius from the center of their 
zip code of residence. 	
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However, recent trends have shown an increase in the rates of mergers and acquisitions 
throughout the U.S. leading to more integrated health systems and concentrated markets, 
especially in urban areas (Baker, Bundorf, and Kessler 2014; Christianson, Carlin, and 
Warwick 2014). Much of this consolidation and integration is occuring through health 
systems and hospitals acquiring physicians practices. From 2002 to 2008 the number of 
physician practices owned by hospitals more than doubled (Kocher and Sahni 2011). 
Furthermore, the recent advent of accoutable care organizaitons has spurred integration 
between hospitals and physicians, with over 400 accoutable care organizaitons in 
existence as of 2013, spanning 49 states and the District of Colubmia (Essential Hospital 
Instititute 2013). These trends suggest that other markets are increasingly becoming more 
like the Twin Cities, thus allowing for analyses conducted in the Twin Cities to be 
applicable to other areas. However, only 7% of my analytic sample resided in rural 
settings, creating difficulty in generalizing my results to non-urban markets.  
 
The university’s broad workforce also strengthens this study’s external validity by not 
limiting the analysis to a narrow subpopulation that could create selection bias. The 
university employs faculty, administrative and professional staff, as well as blue-collar 
workers. This attribute allows for a representative spectrum of individuals, in particular, 
spanning large ranges of income and educational attainment. However, the university’s 
workforce is less racially and ethnically diverse when compared to the entire U.S. labor 
force. Approximately, 15% to 20% of the university’s workforce (not including student-
employees) is comprised of individuals who are either non-White or White Hispanic 
(University of Minnesota Office of Institutional Research 2016) compared to the national 
average of 34% (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2015). 
 
Lastly, although the limited network MEE plan only excluded the majority of one large, 
integrated delivery system, this type of exclusion is becoming more commonplace. In 
2015, the Kaiser Family Foundation reported that 9% of employers (with 50 or more 
employees) had a hospital or health system dropped from a health plan offered to their 
employees (KFF/HRET 2015).  
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4. Data 
 
 
I used three sources of data in this study. First, I obtained 2008 through 2012 claims and 
eligibility files that include the care locations (e.g. clinic, hospital, etc.), health plan 
choices, costs, utilization, and diagnoses as well as enrollee demographic indicators. The 
UPlan changed medical claim vendors in 2012 creating difficulty in appending the 2008 
through 2011 claims with the 2012 claims due non-matching individual identifiers across 
vendors. This occurrence led to the exclusion of roughly 13% of the former 
HealthPartners plan enrollees from the analysis (explained in Section 4.1.3.).  
 
Second, I created a dataset of 875 potential primary care clinics in Minnesota and 
surrounding states by combining the list of clinics that UPlan enrollees visited and the 
clinics reporting to MNCM. To determine the primary care clinics that did not report to 
MNCM, I generated a crosswalk from the provider names in the outpatient claims file to 
clinics (explained in Section 4.1.4.). For this dataset, I obtained the percent of primary 
care and specialty care physicians at each clinic, the percent of physicians by sex at each 
clinic, whether the clinic was part of a hospital, and the latitude and longitude of each 
clinic from on-line sources. 
 
Third, I obtained data from MNCM pertaining to clinic performance on diabetes care 
(2009 through 2012), vascular disease care (2009 through 2012), and patient experience 
(2012) for 620 primary care clinics. I lacked the performance of every primary care clinic 
due to the voluntary nature of reporting, although the non-reporting clinics were not 
highly utilized by the UPlan enrollees. These data also include the number of physicians 
as well as the payor mix for patients with diabetes at each reporting primary care clinic.  
 
 
4.1. UPlan Data Details and Constructed Measures 
 
The UPlan data include outpatient, inpatient, and prescription drug medial claims as well 
as eligibility files, which document health plan choices and demographic indicators 
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including sex, age, campus of employment (for employees), and zip code of home 
residence. I obtained access to the 2008 through 2012 files through the University of 
Minnesota Office of Human Resources. Each year included between 29,982 and 33,366 
adult UPlan enrollees (employees, spouse, and dependents). These data have encrypted 
individual identifiers and no location variables smaller than zip code (with the exception 
of campus work location for employees). 
 
4.1.1. Utilization and Costs  
 
I used the UPlan claims to create utilization and cost measures. I first identified each 
relevant type of utilization: 
 
• Outpatient Utilization: I considered an enrollee with at least one outpatient claim 
with a place of service code for an outpatient facility (see Table A-2) and a length 
of stay equal to one to have had outpatient utilization. I also identified outpatient 
visit types. I defined a unique visit as a set of claims with the same patient 
identifier, same provider identifier and same service date. I created measures for 
the following visit types: 
 
o Primary Care Evaluation and Management (E&M) Visits: Primary care 
E&M visits included visits with a primary care or internal medicine 
provider (See Table A-3) and an office or preventive medicine E&M 
Common Procedural Terminology (CPT) code (see Table A-4). 
 
o Specialty Care Provider E&M Visits: Specialty care E&M visits included 
visits with a non-primary care or -internal medicine provider (see Table 
A-3) and an office or preventive medicine E&M CPT code (see Table A-
4). 
 
o Emergency Department (ED) Visits: ED visits included visits with an ED 
CPT code or UB-04 revenue code (see Table A-4). 
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• Hospital Inpatient Utilization: I considered any enrollee with at least one 
inpatient claim with a hospital inpatient place of service code and a length of stay 
greater than one to have had hospital inpatient utilization. 
 
• Prescription Drug Utilization: I considered any enrollee with at least one 
prescription drug claim to have had prescription drug utilization. 
 
I created cost measures pertaining to total, non-ED outpatient, ED, hospital inpatient, and 
prescription drug utilization. Each measure was the total of plan payments and individual 
out-of-pocket spending. ED, hospital inpatient, and prescription drug expenditures 
included expenditures for all utilization as defined above. Non-ED outpatient 
expenditures included all outpatient utilization minus ED utilization. Thus, the non-ED 
outpatient expenditures included expenditures for primary and specialty provider E&M 
visits as defined above as well as non-E&M visits. Total expenditures were the sum of all 
the expenditures across categories. I adjusted all expenditures to 2012 dollars using the 
medical care component of the consumer price index. 
 
4.1.2. Health Risk Score  
 
I used the Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System risk adjustment algorithm 
developed by Richard Kronick and colleagues at the University of California-San Diego 
to compute a measure of health risk for each enrollee in each year. I indexed the risk 
scores to have a mean of one in the full population of adult UPlan enrollees. Larger risk 
scores signify greater health risk. The algorithm uses ICD-9 codes and prescribed 
medicines from claims to calculate an index measure of expected health care costs in the 
following year. Note, this measure is designed and calibrated for Medicaid populations 
and thus differences in relative payments between diagnoses for Medicaid patients and 
UPlan enrollees create measurement error and attenuate estimated effects towards zero.  
 
I used this measure for reasons of comprehensiveness and convenience. The designers of 
the measure examined every ICD-9 code and received extensive physician feedback in 
		 29 
order to create a comprehensive measure of expected health care costs (Kronick et al. 
2000). From this process the designers created a composite measure that is a linear 
combination of 23 medical condition categories, age, and sex. Thus, the measure has the 
capacity to capture changes in health risk in a way that is more nuanced than using 
demographic indicators or broad measures of past utilization, such as having had a 
hospitalization. Conveniently, the measure’s algorithm is freely available 
(http://cdps.ucsd.edu/) and simple to implement in statistical software packages. 
 
4.1.3. Appending the 2008 through 2011 Claims with the 2012 Claims 
 
In 2012 the UPlan administration changed its medical claim processer and vendor from 
Optum (Minneapolis, Minnesota) to Truven Health Analytics (Ann Arbor, Michigan). 
This change in vendors created differences in the file layout and coding for the 2012 
claims. As part of these changes, Truven Health Analytics created new encrypted 
individual identifiers. Therefore, an individual would have one identifier from 2008 to 
2011 and a new identifier in 2012. Truven Health Analytics provided a crosswalk from 
the old identifiers to the new identifiers, however of the 33,366 adult enrollees in 2012, 
7,113 (21%) did not have a match in the crosswalk (Table 4-1) and could not be 
included in the analysis because I was unable to observe their data prior to when the 
UPlan dropped the HealthPartners plan. The unmatched enrollees were on average 
younger (37.5 for unmatched enrollees vs. 42.5 for the full UPlan population), less likely 
to be female (49.8% vs. 53.6%), and were healthier (0.93 risk score vs. 1.02 risk score) 
compared to the full UPlan adult population. The age and health differences are likely 
due to the unmatched enrollees including all of the new UPlan enrollees in 2012. From 
2009 through 2011, the UPlan enrollment data had roughly 3,300 new unique adult 
observations, suggesting that about half of the unmatched enrollees were new enrollees 
and therefore would have been excluded from the study regardless, because they lacked 
data prior to when the UPlan dropped the HealthPartners plan. In addition, only 36% of 
2011 UPlan enrollees were enrolled in the HealthPartners plan analyzed in this study. 
Therefore, the inability to crosswalk enrollees to the 2012 claims files is responsible for 
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the exclusion of roughly (7,113 – 3,300) * 0.36 ≈ 1,373 enrollees, or 13% (1,373 / (9,452 
+ 1,373) * 100) of the former HealthPartners plan enrollees. 
 
In addition, the 2012 claims used different coding schemes for place of service and 
provider specialty fields, which I used to identify outpatient and inpatient utilization as 
well as to distinguish between primary care and specialty care outpatient E&M visits. 
The place of service codes for each year are listed in Table A-2 and the provider 
specialty codes for each year are listed in Table A-3. 
 
4.1.4. Creation of a Crosswalk from Provider Identifiers to Clinics 
 
I created a crosswalk from the provider identifiers in the claims to clinics in order to 
identify the clinics serving the UPlan population and assign enrollees to primary care 
clinics. From the claims, I took the list of all unique provider name, place of service, and 
provider zip code combinations with at least one primary care outpatient E&M visit. 
Provider names in the data were usually clinician names (of physicians, physician 
assistants, nurses, etc.), but also could be clinic, hospital, or health system names. Using 
on-line provider directories (including health system websites, HealthGrades.com, etc.) I 
matched each provider name, place of service, and provider zip code combination to a 
clinic. I excluded clinics that I determined to be specialty care clinics (obvious by name 
or information on website). I also excluded all clinics in any state other than Minnesota, 
North Dakota, South Dakota, Wisconsin, or Iowa. I appended this list with any MNCM 
reporting clinics not already in the list generated from the claims. I further condensed 
multiple clinics within the same health system but in the same general location (e.g. 
within the same hospital complex, city block) into one clinic, which resulted in reducing 
58 clinics to 22. In general, doing so combined primary care and internal medicine 
departments in hospitals or medical complexes, where determining the specific 
department of individual practitioners was not feasible. In total, I identified 875 primary 
care clinics potentially serving the UPlan population. Of these clinics the majority were 
from Minnesota (637 clinics) with Wisconsin (102), Iowa (49), North Dakota (48), and 
South Dakota (39) accounting for the remainder. Using the list of primary care clinics I 
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attributed each primary care outpatient E&M visit to a clinic, which allowed me to assign 
enrollees to clinics based on a plurality of visits (explain in detail in Section 5.1.).  
 
For this list of primary care clinics, I obtained the percent of primary care and specialty 
care physicians at each clinic, the percent of physicians by sex at each clinic, whether the 
clinic was part of a hospital, and the latitude and longitude of each clinic from health 
system websites and on-line provider directories. 
 
4.1.5. Providers with Unknown or Multiple Clinics 
 
For 9.6% (30,035 of 312,358) of the primary care outpatient E&M visits, I was unable to 
determine the specific primary care clinic location. These cases affected the assignment 
of enrollees to primary care clinics. They do not affect any other constructed measure in 
this study. 
 
For 43% (12,820) of these visits, I was able to construct a reasonable list of possible 
primary care clinics for the visit (generally between 2 to 5 clinics). This occurrence 
typically happened when a provider name, place of service, provider zip code 
combination included a business or headquarters zip code (i.e. not the zip code of the 
clinic) and the clinician given in the provider name field worked at multiple locations 
within his or her health system. For the purposes of primary care clinic assignment based 
on a plurality of visits, I split these visits between the possible clinics. For example, if I 
could not determine whether a visit occurred at Clinic A or Clinic B, then I attributed 0.5 
visits to each primary care clinic.  
 
I was unable to generate a reasonable list of potential primary care clinics for the 
remaining 57% (17,215) of visits with an undeterminable clinic. These cases were 
generally due to a combination of a business or headquarters zip code and the provider 
name field populated with the health system name of a large system (e.g. more than 10 
clinics). I counted these visits towards an “unknown” clinic when making primary care 
clinic assignments. I excluded all enrollees assigned to an “unknown” primary care clinic 
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in at least one year. The impact of these exclusions on the analysis is given in Section 
5.1. and Section 5.2. regarding primary care clinic assignment and the analytic sample 
construction, respectively. 
 
 
4.2. Minnesota Community Measurement Data Details and Constructed Measures 
 
MNCM reports the annual performance of clinics on several quality measures. A 2008 
Minnesota statute mandated public reporting for all Minnesota clinics staring with 2009 
performance (Healthcare Payment and Pricing Reform 2008). Although reporting was 
made mandatory, there is no apparent penalty for not reporting and about 15% of 
Minnesota clinics to date have chosen not to report. Some clinics outside of Minnesota 
voluntarily report. Of the 875 primary care clinics serving the UPlan population, 620 
reported to MNCM at least once. These clinics were mostly located in Minnesota (537 
clinics) with North Dakota (29), Wisconsin (28), South Dakota (23) and Iowa (3) 
accounting for the remainder. I utilized performance for diabetes care (2009 through 
2012), vascular disease care (2009 through 2012), and patient experience (2012) for these 
clinics.  
 
4.2.1. Diabetes and Vascular Disease Care Performance 
 
For diabetes and vascular disease care performance, clinics submit patient-level data to 
MNCM from either electronic medical records or paper-based medical charts. These data 
include a set of treatment goals for each condition. For diabetes care, the set of goals is: 
 
• Hemoglobin A1c < 8% 
 
• Blood pressure < 130/80 mmHg (changed to < 140/80 mmHg in 2010) 
 
• Low-density lipoprotein (LDL)-cholesterol < 100 mg/dl 
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• Daily aspirin use unless contraindicated (changed to included only patients with 
ischemic vascular disease in 2010) 
 
• Documented tobacco-free status 
 
Vascular disease care has the same set of goals excluding the hemoglobin A1c measure. 
For each clinic, MNCM reports the percent of patients in the relevant patient population 
achieving the treatment goal.  
 
Large changes in performance were observed during this study due to changes in the 
definitions of the blood pressure and daily aspirin goals that made them easier to achieve. 
Following McCullough et al. (2015), I estimated the average change in performance due 
to the definition changes and adjusted the performance measures to reflect the new 
definitions. The authors modeled each individual performance measure p for clinic c in 
year t as:  
 !!" = ! + !!! + !!!! + !!"#$%$&$'%! + !"#ℎ!"#! + !" ∗ !"ℎ!"#! + !!" 
 
where t is the reporting year (t = 0 for 2009, t = 1 for 2010, etc.), Definition is an 
indicator equal to 1 if p is performance in a year during or after a definition change and 0 
otherwise, and Cohort is a set of dummy variables for the first year the clinic reported to 
MNCM. I estimated this model using ordinary least squares regression for each diabetes 
and vascular disease care performance measure that had a definition change. I added !, 
the parameter on Definition to all performance measures prior to the definition change. 
 
Using the diabetes and vascular disease care measures, I created two composite 
performance measures: 
 
• Clinical Performance: The average performance on hemoglobin A1c, blood 
pressure, and LDL-cholesterol from the diabetes care measures and blood 
pressure and LDL-cholesterol from the vascular disease care measures. 
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• Behavioral Performance: The average performance on aspirin use and tobacco 
free status rom the diabetes care measures and aspirin use and tobacco free status 
from the vascular disease care measures. 
 
4.2.2. Patient Experience Performance 
 
MNCM conducted patient surveys in 2012 to document patient experience at clinics. The 
survey instrument was the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems 
Clinician & Group 12-Month Survey and was mailed or completed over the phone by a 
random sample of patients (not exclusive to individuals included in this study) who had 
office visits during September through November 2012 (Minnesota Community 
Measurement 2014). The survey contained patient experience measures on four domains: 
 
• Getting Care When Needed 
 
• Courteous and Helpful Staff 
 
• Provider Communication 
 
• Overall Provider Rating  
 
The Getting Care When Needed, Courteous and Helpful Staff, and Provider 
Communication domains consisted of multiple questions answered with “Never”, 
“Sometimes”, “Usually”, or “Always”. The questions are worded such that “Always” is 
the most favorable response (see Table A-5 for specific questions). MNCM created 
composite measures for each of these three domains equal to the percent of questions 
answered with “Always”. The Overall Provider Rating asked respondents to rate their 
provider from 0 (worst) to 10 (best). MNCM reports the percent of respondents rating 
their provider as a 9 or 10. From the population surveyed, MCNM generated patient 
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experience measures for 588 clinics or 67% of the primary care clinics serving the UPlan 
population.  
 
4.2.3. Clinic Characteristics 
 
MNCM data included for each primary care clinic: the number of patients with diabetes 
and vascular disease, the number of practicing physicians, and the proportion of patients 
with diabetes that were enrolled in Minnesota Health Care Programs (includes Medicaid 
and other programs for low-income individuals), Medicare, or private insurance. 
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5. Analysis 
 
 
I determined the effect of switching primary care clinics on costs, utilization, and quality 
of care after enrollment in a limited network plan. The study population consisted of 
UPlan enrollees who selected the limited network MEE plan in 2012 after the University 
of Minnesota dropped a traditional, broad network plan administered by HealthPartners. 
Using a longitudinal difference-in-differences design, I compared the costs and utilization 
of enrollees who switched primary care clinics (because their clinics under the 
HealthPartners plan were excluded in the MEE plan) to the costs and utilization of 
enrollees who did not have to switch clinics. I then determined if enrollees who switched 
primary care clinics selected higher or lower quality clinics by comparing the 
performance of their new clinics to their previous clinics. Lastly, I employed a discrete 
choice model to describe the characteristics of primary care clinics chosen by individuals 
who switched clinics and to determine the relative associations between clinic attributes, 
including quality, and clinic choices. 
 
 
5.1. Primary Care Clinic Assignment 
 
The analysis necessitated assigning enrollees to primary care clinics. In each year from 
2009 through 2012, I assigned each new MEE enrollee to the primary care clinic with the 
plurality of his or her primary care outpatient E&M visits. In cases of ties (11% of 
assignments), I assigned each enrollee to the primary care clinic with his or her plurality 
of primary care outpatient expenditures. Thirty-three percent of enrollees had no primary 
care outpatient E&M visits in either 2011 or 2012 and were excluded from the analysis 
because I could not assign them to primary care clinics.9 Unsurprisingly, compared to all 
new MEE enrollees (Table 5-1), enrollees without primary care visits were substantially 
healthier (0.65 risk score for enrollees without primary care visits vs. 1.01 risk score for 																																																								9	The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention estimated that in 2014 that approximately 21% of adults, 
aged 18-65, had no contact with any health professional, thus one-third of the new MEE enrollees not 
having a primary care outpatient E&M visit in either 2011 or 2012 is reasonable.	
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all MEE enrollees) as well as younger (41.0 vs. 43.9) and less likely to be female (40.2% 
vs. 54.0%).  
 
Fourteen percent of new MEE enrollees were assigned to an “unknown” primary care 
clinic in either 2011 or 2012 because the plurality of their primary care outpatient E&M 
visits were at undeterminable locations. Enrollees assigned to  “unknown” primary care 
clinics in 2011 or 2012 were excluded from the analysis because I could not determine if 
they switched clinics. Compared to enrollees whose primary care clinics were “known”, 
enrollees with “unknown” clinics were younger (42.6 for enrollees with an “unknown” 
clinic vs. 46.2 for enrollees with a “known” clinic), less likely to be female (54.1% vs. 
62.5%), and healthier (1.07 risk score vs. 1.22 risk score). 
 
Seven percent of new MEE enrollees were assigned to primary care clinics that did not 
report diabetes or vascular disease care performance to MNCM in either 2011 or 2012. 
Compared to all enrollees assigned to primary care clinics, these enrollees were younger 
(41.8 for enrollees at non-reporting clinics vs. 46.2 for all enrollees assigned to clinics), 
substantially more likely to be female (79.5% vs. 62.5%), and healthier (1.07 risk score 
vs. 1.22 risk score). The higher percent of female enrollees among this group is largely 
due to women obtaining primary care at obstetrics/gynecology clinics, which may not 
meet the requirements for reporting to MNCM. In addition, 16% of new MEE enrollees 
were assigned to primary care clinics for which patient experience measures were not 
reported. Compared to all enrollees assigned to primary care clinics, these enrollees were 
again younger (43.7 for enrollees at non-reporting clinics vs. 46.2 for all enrollees 
assigned to clinics), and healthier (1.07 risk score vs. 1.22 risk score), although no 
substantial difference existed in the percent of enrollees by sex. I excluded observations 
at non-reporting clinics from any analyses using the corresponding MNCM performance 
measures. 
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5.2. Analytic Sample 
 
The analytic sample was generated from individuals who were enrolled in the broad 
network HealthPartners plan in 2011 and then enrolled in the limited network MEE plan 
in 2012. Of 9,452 former HealthPartners plan enrollees, 5,194 (55%) selected the MEE 
plan in 2012 (Figure 5-1). Forty-one percent of former HealthPartners enrollees selected 
the tiered-network MCI plan in 2012. The MCI enrollees were on average sicker than the 
new MEE enrollees while the new MEE enrollees’ had an average health risk similar to 
that of the full UPlan population. This occurrence was expected as sicker enrollees 
generally have a preference for less restrictive health plans (Strombom et al. 2002). 
Although the MCI enrollees constituted a possible control group of individuals who did 
not switch primary care clinics, using them in that manner likely would produce results 
reflecting differences between being in a limited network relative to being in a tiered-
network, rather than the effect of switching clinics. Therefore, I excluded the MCI 
enrollees from the analysis. Four percent of enrollees selected a plan other than the MCI 
or MEE plan. Because these enrollees were primarily from campuses outside the Twin 
Cities that are not in the vicinity of HealthPartners providers, they were largely 
unaffected in terms of primary care clinic choices and therefore also excluded from the 
analysis. From the new MEE enrollees, I created my treatment and control groups: 
 
• Treatment Group: Enrollees who selected the MEE plan and switched out of 
HealthPartners primary care clinics due to network restrictions (N = 1,151; 22% 
of new MEE enrollees). 
 
• Control Group: Enrollees who selected the MEE plan and did not switch primary 
care clinics because their original clinics were in the MEE plan’s network (N = 
916; 18% of new MEE enrollees). 
 
Comparatively, the treatment and control groups were of similar age (46.9 for enrollees 
who did switch primary care clinics vs. 46.8 for enrollees who did not switch clinics), 
although enrollees who switched clinics were less likely to be female (57.3% vs. 61.5%) 
		 39 
and healthier (1.19 risk score vs. 1.30 risk score). I controlled for these differences in my 
analyses by including sex and health risk as explanatory variables. The remaining MEE 
enrollees were excluded. Reasons for exclusion included: 
 
• Voluntarily switching primary care clinics10 (N = 651, 13% of new MEE 
enrollees) 
 
• No primary care outpatient E&M visits in 2011 or 2012 (N = 1,739, 33% of new 
MEE enrollees) 
 
• An undeterminable primary care clinic in 2011 or 2012 (N = 737, 14% of new 
MEE enrollees) 
 
5.3. Sample Selection Issues 
 
The above exclusions create an analytic sample that is older, more likely to be female, 
and sicker compared to all of the new MEE enrollees as well as the full UPlan 
population. This occurrence may weaken the generalizability of the analysis to healthier 
populations, however switching primary care clinics likely has less effect on healthy 
individuals and knowing the effects of switching clinics on sicker individuals is of more 
importance. Still, issues pertaining to selection into the treatment and control groups 
existed that must be addressed in order to better understand and interpret results. First, I 
excluded enrollees who voluntarily switched primary care clinics. I make this exclusion 
due to the potential endogeneity of voluntary switching. However, I am only able to 
observe this event among enrollees who could have been selected into the control group. 
A portion of the enrollees in the treatment group may have voluntarily switched out of 
HealthPartners primary care clinics regardless of enrolling in the MEE plan. If the effect 
of switching primary care clinics differs between the voluntary and non-voluntary 
switchers, then the inclusion of the voluntary switchers in the treatment group creates 																																																								
10 For the MEE plan I defined voluntarily switching primary care clinics as switching from a non-excluded 
HealthPartners primary care clinic to any other clinic. 
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bias when interpreting the estimated effect of switching as the effect of being forced to 
switch clinics after enrollment in a limited network plan. To address this issue, I 
conducted a sensitivity analysis in which I repeated the main analysis but included the 
voluntary switchers I did observe (i.e. enrollees who were not initially assigned to 
HealthPartners primary care clinics and switched clinics) in the control group. Doing so, I 
was able to compare the results of the main analysis with the results of this sensitivity 
analysis to infer whether the effect of switching clinics was different between the 
voluntary and non-voluntary switchers.  
 
Second, enrollees who originally selected HealthPartners primary care clinics (i.e. the 
treatment group) may systematically differ from enrollees who initially selected clinics in 
other health systems (i.e. the control group). If these differences are unobservable and 
correlated with both selection into HealthPartners primary care clinics and the outcomes 
used as dependent variables, then they potentially create an omitted variable bias. One 
potential source for this type of bias is unobserved health differences between the clinic 
switchers and non-switchers that are not accounted for in the health risk score. Although, 
the health risk score is based on 23 condition categories, minor health problems (e.g. 
muscle sprains, colds, etc.) are excluded from the measure. In addition, because the 
health risk score is based on ICD-9 codes and medication prescriptions, variation in 
illnesses that fall under the same codes or prescriptions is not captured in the measure. 
Unfortunately, because these unobserved health differences likely change over time, they 
are difficult to control for without the use of sophisticated methodology such as an 
instrumental variable analysis, which I was unable to conduct in this study. Furthermore, 
HealthPartners is generally known for having a larger focus and commitment to 
strengthen the capabilities of its primary care providers compared to other health systems 
in the Twin Cities (Alliance of Community Health Plans 2013). This attribute could 
attract patients with a preference for managing conditions through primary care rather 
than specialty care. I used health system fixed effects to control for differences in practice 
style across the primary care clinics when estimating the effect of switching clinics on 
costs and utilization (explain in Section 5.4.), however these preference differences are 
problematic if patients are able to influence the practice style of their providers. Such an 
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occurrence is plausible if primary care providers rely heavily on patient-centered care. I 
discuss this possibility and implications of this occurrence in the results (Section 6.) and 
subsequent discussion (Section 7.). 
 
 
5.4. Effects of Switching Primary Care Clinics on Costs and Utilization 
 
Using a difference-in-differences approach, I compared the costs and utilization of new 
MEE enrollees who switched their primary care clinics in 2012 to new MEE enrollees 
who remained in their same clinics throughout the study period. Figure 5-2 and Figure 
5-3 present the costs and utilization from 2008 through 2012, respectively, for MEE 
enrollees who switched primary care clinics in 2012 and enrollees who did not switch 
clinics. To correctly use a difference-in-differences approach the treatment and control 
groups must have parallel trends in outcomes during the pre-period in order to assume 
that any change in outcomes for the control group in the post-period is the correct 
counterfactual. This feature does not mean that the treatment and control groups must 
have insignificant differences in costs and utilization, but rather equal growth, as the 
treatment group indicator controls for the persistent differences. In my sample, the 
primary care clinic switchers were healthier than the non-switchers and generally had 
lower costs and utilization throughout the pre-period. However, the only major 
differences in the growth between the primary care clinic switchers and non-switchers 
were between 2008 and 2009, when the non-switchers had larger increases in total and 
non-ED outpatient expenditures as the well the percent of enrollees with a 
hospitalization. Given these significant growth differences, I used 2009 through 2012 as 
the study period and exclude all prior years. From 2009 through 2011, no significant 
differences in the costs or utilization trends existed between the primary care clinic 
switchers and non-switchers, with only one exception of a significant (p-value=0.064) 
decrease in the percent of enrollees with a hospitalization for non-switchers relative to 
clinic switchers from 2009 to 2010.  
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I estimated several cost and utilization outcomes from 2009 through 2012 using the same 
model. For brevity, I present a linear model below, although the specific regressions used 
were non-linear. The linear combination of right-hand side variables remained the same 
in all regressions. Specifically, I modeled each outcome Y for person i at time t as: 
 !!" = ! + !!!"#$%ℎ!"! ∗ !! + !!!"#$%ℎ!"! + !!!"#$%ℎ!,!!! + !!!"#$%"! + !!!"#!" +  !! + !!" 
 
where Switcher is an indicator for whether an enrollee switched his or her primary care 
clinic in 2012 (equal to 1) or did not switch clinics (equal to 0). I interacted Switcher with 
year dummy variables (τ) to control for differential time trends in costs and utilization for 
primary care switchers and non-switchers. The interaction term, Switcher *  τ2012, 
captures the treatment effect of switching primary care clinics in the post-period after the 
UPlan dropped the HealthPartners plan, thus making the parameter δ2012 the difference-
in-differences estimate. Health is the individual risk score calculated from ICD-9 
diagnoses codes and prescription medications and is entered as a lag to avoid endogeneity 
between contemporaneous measures of utilization and health. I found that using Health in 
a continuous and linear fashion produced expenditures results that were sensitive to the 
inclusion and exclusion of outlier observations with very large risk scores. To avoid this 
issue, I used health risk quartiles (based on the full UPlan population) with quartile 1 
including the healthiest enrollees and quartile 4 including the sickest enrollees. The 
model also controlled for differences in costs and utilization by sex and age. Year dummy 
variables (τ) were included in the model to control for general time trends in utilization. 
The year 2012 dummy variable also controlled for changes in utilization due to 
enrollment in the limited network plan that were the same for the primary care clinics 
switchers and non-switchers. Lastly, ε is an idiosyncratic error term.  
 
Two possible reasons switching primary care clinics may affect costs and utilization are a 
disruption to continuity-of-care and selecting a clinic with different attributes (e.g. 
physician practice style, quality, etc.) than the previous clinic. To take these possible 
occurrences into account, I also estimated a model that included health system fixed 
effects and clinic performance on clinical and behavioral quality. The health system fixed 
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effects controlled for time-invariant attributes of primary care clinics’ health systems, 
while the performance measures helped control for differences in quality over time. 
Ideally, I would have used clinic fixed effects rather than health system fixed effects, 
however several models were unable to converge with clinic fixed effects due to 
enrollees being assigned to over 200 clinics, some having only a few assigned enrollees. 
Given high-levels of integration exhibited by health systems in Minnesota, the attributes 
of primary care clinics within the same system are unlikely to greatly vary. Recent 
research showing that clinics within health system have similar clinical and behavioral 
quality for diabetes care supports this notion (Crespin et al. 2016). By adding these 
explanatory variables to the model, I can better infer whether any significant effect of 
switching primary care clinics is tied to issues of continuity-of-care versus clinic 
attributes. In particular, if the treatment effect is significant without the added health 
system fixed effects and performance measures, but insignificant with them, then the 
effect of switching primary care clinics is likely due to differences in clinic attributes. On 
the other hand if the inclusion of the health system fixed effects and performance 
measures has no effect on the significance or magnitude of the treatment effect, it is more 
likely that the effect of switching primary care clinics is associated with aspects of 
discontinuous care. 
 
The effect of switching primary care providers for sicker patients is of particular concern, 
because they have the most to gain from sustained primary care provider relationships 
and receiving care at the highest quality providers (Bodenheimer 2008; Nutting et al. 
2003). Therefore, I also estimated each model including triple interaction terms between 
Switcher, Health and the year dummy variables (τ) to determine if switching primary care 
clinics had different effects by health risk. 
 
I began by estimating the probabilities of having had a hospitalization or an ED visit. I 
used probit regressions for these outcomes because the dependent variables are binary. A 
drawback of this model is that some of the health system fixed effects are perfect 
predictors of the outcomes because none of their assigned enrollees had a hospitalization 
or ED visit, which occurred at health systems with very few assigned enrollees. However, 
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this occurrence affected less than 1% of enrollee-year observations, which I dropped 
from the regressions that included health system fixed effects. In addition, no enrollees 
who switched primary care clinics and who were in the healthiest quartile had a 
hospitalization in 2012 and thus the treatment effect within the quartile was not 
estimable. I combined the two healthiest quartiles for the regression estimating the 
probability of having a hospitalization. 
 
Second, I estimated the number of visits to primary care providers and the number of 
visits to specialty care providers. I used negative binomial regressions for these outcomes 
because the dependent variables are counts, both with a variance significantly different 
than its mean, thus breaking the assumptions of the Poisson model. I employed a zero-
truncated regression for visits to primary care providers because all enrollees in the 
analytic sample had at least one primary care visit (needed to be assigned to a primary 
care clinic).  Conversely, a truncated regression was not necessary for estimating visits 
with specialty care providers because 47% of enrollee-year observations did not have a 
visit with a specialty care provider. 
 
Third, I estimated total, non-ED outpatient, prescription drug, hospital inpatient, and ED 
expenditures. Because the vast majority of enrollees had no hospital inpatient or ED 
costs, I elected to use a two-part model to estimate these costs, using the above utilization 
models to obtain the probabilities of having had a hospitalization or an ED visit. Then, I 
estimated hospital inpatient and ED costs using models conditional on utilization. I 
calculated the effect of switching primary care clinics as the predicted probability of 
utilization in 2012 multiplied by the cost associated with switching clinics conditional on 
utilization. For all cost outcomes, I follow the algorithm of Manning and Mullahy (2001) 
to select the functional form of the regressions for health care costs. In all cases I used 
generalized liner models with a logarithm link function. I used a Poisson variance 
structure for total, non-ED outpatient, and prescription drug expenditures. I used a 
gamma variance structure for hospital inpatient and ED expenditures. 
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The interaction terms that were used to estimate the treatment effects of switching 
primary care clinics are not directly interpretable, either in magnitude or significance, 
because I used non-linear models. Due to this non-linearity, the treatment effects vary 
over the different combinations of the explanatory variables. I followed the suggestion of 
Karaca-Mandic, Norton, and Dowd (2011) to obtain interpretable treatment effects. First, 
I calculated the average marginal effect of Switcher for each year. Then I measured the 
effect of switching primary care clinics as the average marginal effect of Switcher in 
2012 minus the average marginal effect of Switcher in 2011. For the models with health 
risk interactions, I estimated a switcher-year average marginal effect for each health risk 
quartile to obtain a treatment effect for each quartile. 
 
In all regressions, I clustered my standard errors by enrollee to adjust for correlation 
between observations from the same individual over time. These clustered standard errors 
are used to determine the significance of the marginal effects, with the exception of the 
two part models for hospital inpatient and ED costs. Due to the complexity of calculating 
their standard errors through conventional means, I used bootstrapping to obtain standard 
errors for the two-part models. I drew random samples (equal to the full sample size) with 
replacement and re-estimated the model and expected cost calculations 200 times. I used 
the standard deviations from those 200 calculations as the standard errors of expected 
costs. 
 
 
5.5. Difference in Quality After Switching Primary Care Clinics 
 
I compared the performance of the primary care clinics chosen by the new MEE plan 
enrollees who switched clinics to their previous clinics under the HealthPartners plan. 
This analysis gives an estimate of the level of quality enrollees who switched primary 
care clinics would have received if they could have kept their original clinics. For this 
analysis, I employed performance measures for clinical and behavioral quality as well as 
patient experience as reported by MNCM for services obtained in 2012. For each 
measure, I used a paired t-test to determine if a significant difference existed in the 
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performance of enrollees’ new clinics relative to their previous clinics. Enrollees in worse 
health may be more likely to seek out higher quality primary care clinics compared to 
relatively healthy enrollees, thus I also report these statistics stratified by health risk 
quartile. 
 
 
5.6. Clinic Attributes Associated with Primary Care Clinic Choices 
 
In my last analysis I describe the characteristics of the primary care clinics chosen by the 
new MEE plan enrollees who switched clinics. The particular focus of this analysis is to 
understand the relative magnitudes of the associations between primary care clinic 
attributes and clinic choices. Economists have commonly used random utility theory to 
describe consumers’ discrete choices of goods and services (Greene 2012). In this 
application, enrollees associate utility with each primary care clinic based on the 
characteristics of each clinic. For primary care clinic j, enrollee i’s utility u is given by: 
 !!" = !!! + !!" 
 
where X represents a vector of primary care clinic characteristics (e.g. quality, distance to 
the clinic, etc.) and ε is a clinic-specific error term. With two choices (Clinic A and Clinic 
B), the enrollee compares the utility associated with each choice and selects Clinic A if 
uiA > uiB and Clinic B if uiB > uiA. Assuming that ε have standard Type I extreme value 
distributions with density: 
 ! !!" = !!!!!!"     
 
then the probability enrollee i chooses clinic j from m clinics is given by: 
 !!" = !!!!!!!!!!!!  
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which may be estimated with maximum likelihood estimation. This model is commonly 
known as the conditional logit model. The magnitudes of the parameters (β) represent the 
relative utility associated with each primary care clinic characteristic. 
 
However, the conditional logit model is held to the restrictive assumption of 
independence of irrelevant alternatives. In other words, the clinic-specific errors terms 
must be independent from one another, such that the removal of any one choice does not 
influence the estimated odds of selecting any other choice (Greene 2012). Correlation of 
the clinic-specific error terms can arise when a subset of choice are close substitutes for 
one another. In this study, enrollees may view primary care clinics in the same health 
system as substitutes because they have the same brand name and offer integrated, 
system-wide care. In addition, the eight HealthPartners primary care clinics that remained 
in-network under the MEE plan may be close substitutes with one another, because they 
offered enrollees the benefit of staying within the same health system.  
 
To relax the assumption of independence of irrelevant alternatives, I estimated two nested 
logit models alongside the non-nested conditional logit model. The first nested logit 
model is a two-branch model allowing HealthPartners to have its own branch. For the 
second model, I allowed one branch for each large health system in the Twin Cities, 
while grouping the smaller systems into their own branch. These large health systems 
include HealthPartners along with Allina Health (46), Fairview Health Services (39 
clinics), HealthEast Care System (14), Park Nicollet Health Services (19), and University 
of Minnesota Physicians (6). The primary care clinics of these health systems accounted 
for 90% of all primary care clinics choices. The nested logit model estimates the 
probabilities of choosing each health system and the conditional probabilities of choosing 
each primary care clinic given the system choice. The probability of individual i choosing 
health system branch l of n branches is: 
 !!" = !!!"!!!!!!!!"!!!!!!!!!  
 
		 48 
where Z represents variables that explain the health system branch choice. In this study, 
these variables were enrollee demographic indicators for age, sex, and health risk. The 
indicator I is the inclusive value and it, along with its parameter (θ), corresponds to the 
expected utility enrollees derived from the primary care clinic choices in health system 
branch l and was used to scale the parameters to take into account individuals’ preference 
over each system branch (Heiss 2002). By allowing enrollees to weigh their health 
system choices by the inclusive value, the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption is relaxed such that it only needs to hold within each system branch. The 
inclusive value is defined as: 
 !!! = !!!"!!!!!  
 
Then, the unconditional probability of individual i choosing primary care clinic j of m 
choices is: 
 !!"# = !!"|! ∗ !!" = !!!"!!!!"!!!!! ∗ !!!"!!!!!!!!"!!!!!!!!! = !!!"!!!!!!!!"!!!!"!!!!!!!!! ∗ !!!"!!!!  
 
where Pij|l is the probability of choosing primary care clinic j given the choice of health 
system branch l and Pil is the probability of choosing system branch l. This model may be 
estimated in one-step using full information likelihood estimation. If θ is not significantly 
different than one, then enrollees weigh each health system equally and the model 
collapses to the non-nested version.  
 
Estimation of the nested logit models produced parameter estimates for the primary care 
clinic attributes (β), the enrollee demographics determining health system choice (γ) and 
the inclusive values (θ). I used these parameters to calculate the elasticity of the 
probability of primary care clinic choice with respect to each clinic attribute. The 
elasticity of choosing primary care clinic j in health system l with respect to clinic 
attribute x∈X is: 
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!!"# = !!" 1− !!|! + !!(1− !!)!!|! !! 
 
I calculated each elasticity for each enrollee using his or her observed data for x. Then, I 
averaged over all enrollee-observations of the same health system to produce an average 
elasticity for each system. I used bootstrapping to obtain standard errors. I drew random 
samples (equal to the full sample size) with replacement and re-estimated the model and 
elasticity calculations 200 times. I used the standard deviations from those 200 
calculations as the standard errors. 
 
I included several primary care clinic characteristics in the model. Quality indicators 
included the clinic performance measures for clinical quality, behavioral quality, and 
patient experience. For the patient experience measures, the correlation coefficient for 
Getting Care When Needed and Overall Provider Rating was 0.80. Inclusion of both of 
these indicators led to issues of inconsistency due to multicollinearity and I therefore 
choose to exclude Overall Provider Rating. The inclusion of the performance measures 
excluded 7% of enrollees (N = 81) because they switched to primary care clinics that did 
not report to MNCM. In addition, another 7% of enrollees (N = 80) switched to primary 
care clinics for which no patient experience measures were reported, although clinical 
and behavioral performance measures were. For this reason, I ran two sets of models, one 
including the patient experience measures and one excluding them. 
 
I also included several non-quality attributes that could influence primary care clinic 
choices. First, because individuals are likely to choose primary care clinics that require 
less travel, I included distance from the center of individuals’ zip codes of residence to 
the clinic. I also included measures related to physician and patient mix. I included the 
number of physicians, the percent of specialty care physicians, and the percent of female 
physicians. Lastly, I included the percent of patients with diabetes who are enrolled in 
Medicare or MHCP because the privately insured enrollees of this study may have been 
less likely to choose primary care clinics with a high proportion of patients with public 
insurance. Unfortunately, the MNCM data only included the payor mix for patients with 
diabetes and not for all-cause patients. Thus, I worked under the assumption that the 
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percent of patients with diabetes by payor is the same for all-cause patients within each 
primary care clinic. 
 
Estimating the model necessitated constructing the set of primary care clinics from which 
each enrollee could reasonably choose. I constructed the choice sets based on willingness 
to travel. In 2012, the Washington State Office of Financial Management surveyed 
individuals and asked how far they traveled for routine care (Yen 2013). The author 
found that urban individuals traveled approximately 7.5 miles on average while non-
urban individuals traveled roughly 10.0 miles. I used these estimates to determine the 
radii for enrollees’ clinic choice sets. Because some enrollees necessarily travel more 
than the average I add 5 miles for urban and 7.5 miles for rural enrollees to the average 
travel distance. Thus, I defined an urban (rural) enrollee’s choice set as all clinic within a 
12.5-mile (17.5-mile) radius from the center of his or her zip code of residence. This 
method excluded only 7% of enrollees, who chose a primary care clinic that was not 
within their defined market area (N = 81). Demographically, these enrollees were similar 
to the non-excluded enrollees and no clear pattern in their primary care clinic choices 
existed, making it difficult to determine why they choose clinics that were farther away. 
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6. Results 
 
 
6.1. Effects of Switching Primary Care Clinics on Costs and Utilization 
 
Table 6-1 through Table 6-5 present the coefficients of the regression estimates 
predicting costs and utilization for UPlan enrollees who enrolled in the MEE plan in 
2012. The interaction terms that determine the effects of switching primary care clinics 
are not directly interpretable, either in magnitude or significance, because I employed 
non-linear regression models. I present interpretable results of the effects of switching 
primary care clinics in corresponding figures denoted in the text (Figure 6-1, Figure 6-2, 
Figure 6-5, and Figure 6-6). With only two exceptions (called out in the text below), I 
found little difference in the effect of switching primary care clinics when I included 
health system fixed effects and clinic performance measures. To avoid redundancy, the 
figures and text present results from the full model that includes the health system fixed 
effects and the clinic performance measures unless otherwise noted.  
 
I found no evidence that switching primary care clinics had an effect on the probabilities 
of having a hospitalization or an ED visit (Table 6-1 and Figure 6-1). Figure 6-1 shows 
that none of the average marginal effects of switching primary care clinics on these 
outcomes were statistically significant, either for the overall study population or within 
each individual health risk quartile. For enrollees in the sickest health risk quartile, the 
effect of switching primary care clinics on the probability of having a hospitalization was 
large in terms of magnitude (6.8 percentage points (95% Confidence Interval (CI): -8.2 to 
15.7)) but imprecisely estimated (p-value = 0.367), producing little confidence that it was 
a true effect.  
 
Switching primary care clinics did affect the number of visits with primary care and 
specialty care providers. Coefficients for the models predicting visits with primary care 
and specialty care providers are presented in Table 6-2. Without controlling for health 
system fixed effects and clinic performance, I found that switching primary care clinics 
was associated with an average increase of 0.22 (95% CI: -0.02 to 0.46) primary care 
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visits per year. However, this effect was insignificant when I included the health system 
fixed effects and clinic performances (Figure 6-2), suggesting that the increase in 
primary care visits after switching primary care clinics likely was due to differences in 
clinic attributes between enrollees’ new and previous clinics rather than a disruption of 
continuity-of-care. In part, the increase in primary care visits after switching primary care 
clinics may have been due to the quality of the new clinic choices. The regression results 
indicate that enrollees assigned to primary care clinics with lower clinical performance 
had more primary care visits (0.03 visits per 1 percentage point decrease in clinical 
performance (95% CI: 0.01 to 0.05)). If enrollees switched to primary care clinics of 
lower clinical quality (which on average they did, see Section 6.2.) then they would have 
had an increase in primary care visits associated with the quality of the clinics. When I 
estimated the marginal effect of switching primary care clinics for each health risk 
quartile (Figure 6-2) I found that for the sickest health risk quartile, enrollees who 
switched clinics had 1.01 (95% CI: 0.08 to 1.95) more primary care visits than enrollees 
who did not switch clinics. This result held with and without the health system fixed 
effects and clinic performance, suggesting that it was tied to discontinuous care rather 
than clinic attributes. No significant effect of switching primary care clinics on primary 
care visits existed for the other health risk quartiles. 
 
I found that enrollees who switched primary care clinics had fewer visits with specialty 
care providers than enrollees who did not switch clinics. Without controlling for health 
system fixed effects or clinic performance, enrollees who switched primary care clinics 
had on average 0.33 (95% CI: 0.14 to 0.52) fewer visits with specialty care providers than 
enrollees who did not switch clinics. The magnitude of the effect size increased to 0.50 
(95% CI: 0.22 to 0.78) fewer visits when the health system fixed effects and clinic 
performance were included (Figure 6-2). Because the effect remained significant, this 
result suggests that the decrease in specialty care provider visits for enrollees who 
switched primary care clinics is associated with disruptions to continuity-of-care. The 
change in magnitude of the effect with the inclusion of the health system fixed effects 
and clinic performance implies that enrollees switched to primary care clinics that used 
more specialty care than their previous clinics. While enrollees did have fewer specialty 
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care provider visits after switching primary care clinics, my result indicate that these 
enrollees would have had even fewer visits if they had switched to clinics with the same 
attributes as their previous clinics. The quality of the primary care clinics may play a role 
in the effect size change. Enrollees at primary care clinics with lower behavioral 
performance had more visits with specialty care providers (0.020 visits per 1 percentage 
point decrease in behavioral performance (95% CI: 0.006 to 0.034)). Because enrollees 
switched to primary care clinics with lower behavioral performance and behavioral 
performance was negatively correlated with specialty care provider visits, the exclusion 
of behavioral performance leads to an upward omitted variable bias on the effect of 
switching clinics (-0.33 > -0.50). However, clinical quality was positively correlated with 
specialty care provider visits (0.015 visits per 1 percentage point increase in clinical 
performance (95% CI: 0.003 to 0.027)) and thus its omitted variable bias would be 
downward. Given the similarity in the magnitude of the marginal effects for behavioral 
and clinical quality, but opposite signs, the influence of these two measures could cancel 
out when determining the omitted variable bias, therefore, other attributes of enrollees’ 
new primary care clinics likely are associated with more utilization of specialty care.  
 
I found a similar decrease in specialty care provider visits after switching primary care 
clinics among the middle two health risk quartiles (Figure 6-2). Here, I present results 
from the full model including health system fixed effects and clinic performance. For the 
2nd quartile switching primary care clinics was associated with a 0.77 (95% CI: 0.46 to 
1.07) decrease in visits with specialty care providers and for the 3rd quartile switching 
clinics was associated with a 0.48 (95% CI: -0.10 to 1.07) decrease in visits. For the 4th 
quartile (sickest enrollees), the average marginal effect was of similar magnitude (0.50 
visits), however the preciseness of the estimate was slightly outside conventional 
significance levels with a p-value of 0.178 and 95% CI of -0.23 to 1.23. 
 
I examined the change in the timing of visits with primary care and specialty care 
providers to better understand how enrollees’ utilization changed after switching primary 
care clinics. Figure 6-3 presents the change from the previous year in the number of 
primary care visits by month for enrollees in the sickest health quartile who switched 
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primary care clinics compared to enrollees who did not switch clinics. Overall, the 
increase in primary care visits after switching primary care clinics occurred from 
February through April. Figure 6-4 shows the timing of visits with specialty care 
providers for enrollees in the three sickest health risk quartiles. As expected, because the 
enrollees moved from a broad to limited network plan, both enrollees who switched 
primary care clinics and enrollees who did not switch had fewer visits with specialty care 
providers in the beginning of 2012 relative to 2011. However, enrollees who switched 
primary care clinics had fewer specialty care visits in every month in the year (except for 
a tie in October) after switching clinics compared to the previous year, while enrollees 
who did not switch clinics were at or near their 2011 level (including have more specialty 
care provider visits in 4 months) starting in March. The largest difference for this 
disparity occurred from February through July, with the exception of April. The increase 
in specialty care provider visits in April for enrollees who switched clinics is driven by 
enrollees in the sickest quartile who also experienced their increase in primary care visits 
at that time. These results suggest that enrollees were not accessing specialty care 
providers in early 2012, either due to difficulty in obtaining care or choosing to not seek 
specialty care during this time. The increase in primary care visits among the sickest 
enrollees may be, in part, a substitution for specialty care provider visits.  
 
The timing of these visits bolsters the evidence that these effects are tied to disruptions in 
continuity-of-care rather than the attributes of the primary care clinics or unobserved 
enrollees characteristics. As noted in Section 5.3. a potential source of selection bias in 
this analysis is that enrollees who originally selected HealthPartners primary care clinics 
may systematical differ from enrollees who initially selected clinics in other health 
systems, for example, by having a preference to have illnesses managed through primary 
care rather than specialty care. However, if systematic differences between the switchers 
and non-switchers drove these results, then I would expect that the differences in visits, 
particularly for visits with specialty care providers, would have been persistent 
throughout the entire year after switching primary care clinics rather than only during the 
first-half of the year. 
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In Table 6-3, I explore differences in visits with specialty care providers by specialty 
type. I present these data in two ways, both corresponding to differences that occurred in 
the first 7 months of 2012, when the largest decrease in specialty care provider visits 
occurred. The first column simply shows the difference in visits between the first 7 
months of 2012 and the first 7 months of 2011 for enrollees who switched primary care 
clinics. The second column presents a differences-in-differences statistic taking the 
difference in visits per enrollee for the clinic switchers and subtracting from it the 
difference in visits per enrollee for the non-switchers. The cell sizes within each specialty 
are quite small (between 10 to 75 visits per group for each 7 month period) and thus 
caution must be taken in generalizing these results. Using either statistic in Table 6-3, the 
largest decrease in specialty care provider visits was for dermatology, for which clinic 
switchers (N = 823) had 33 fewer visits in the first 7 months of 2012 relative to 2011. 
Other specialties with potentially large health implications among the specialties with the 
largest differences included oncology (25 fewer visits) and general surgery (23 fewer 
visits).  
 
I found little evidence suggesting that switching primary care clinics had an effect on 
expenditures of any type. I report the coefficients for the expenditure regressions in 
Table 6-4 (Total), Table 6-5 (Non-ED Outpatient and Prescription Drug) and Table 6-6 
(Hospital Inpatient and ED) with the average marginal effect of switching clinics 
presented in Figure 6-5 (Total, Non-ED Outpatient and Prescription Drug) and Figure 6-
6 (Hospital Inpatient and ED). The only significant effects of switching primary care 
clinics on expenditures were on total and non-ED outpatient expenditures for enrollees of 
the 2nd health risk quartile (Figure 6-5). Enrollees in the 2nd health risk quartile who 
switched primary care clinics had $1,593 (95% CI: $88 to $3,275) less in total 
expenditures and $1,458 (95% CI: $246 to $2,670) less in non-ED outpatient 
expenditures, on average, compared to enrollees who did not switch clinics (Figure 6-5). 
The closeness of these two estimates implies nearly the entire increase in total 
expenditures was the increase in non-ED outpatient expenditures. However, these 
enrollees experienced an increase in non-ED outpatient expenditures in 2011 relative to 
enrollees who did not switch clinics. For enrollees in the 2nd health risk quartile in 2011, 
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enrollees who switched primary care clinics had $1,055 (95% CI: $233 to $1,878) more 
in non-ED outpatient expenditures compared to enrollees who did not switch clinics (data 
not shown). Together, the positive effect in 2011 (before switching primary care clinics) 
and the negative effect of similar magnitude in 2012 (after switching clinics), make it 
unlikely that the effect in 2012 was completely due to switching clinics. A potential 
explanation is that these enrollees could have received additional care in late-2011, 
knowing that some of their providers would become out-of-network in the following year 
and thus would have received less care in 2012. However, if this scenario had occurred 
then I would have expected to observe increases in visits with primary care and specialty 
care providers in late-2011, which did not happen (see Figure 6-4 for specialty care 
provider visits), as well as a similar pattern for enrollees of the other health risk quartiles, 
which also did not occur. Given that these patterns did not exist, this result likely is 
attributable to statistical noise or regression to the mean for this subset of enrollees. 
Interestingly, the magnitude of the effect of switching primary care clinics for enrollees 
in the sickest health risk quartile on total expenditures was large ($1,471 (95%: -$6,108 
to $9,052)), although it was very imprecisely estimated (p-value = 0.704) due to 
imprecision in the estimation of hospital inpatient expenditures (Figure 6-6). Overall, 
these results provide little evidence that switching primary care clinics had an effect on 
expenditures.  
 
I repeated the full analysis including the voluntary switchers who were originally 
assigned to non-HealthPartners primary care clinics in the control group. I conducted this 
sensitivity analysis to infer whether the presence of enrollees in the treatment group who 
would have voluntarily switched primary care clinics, regardless of their enrollment in 
the MEE plan, biases the interpretation of the results as the effect of being forced to 
switch clinics. Like the main analysis, no significant differences in the probabilities of 
having had a hospitalization or an ED visit, or any of the expenditures measures existed 
between the enrollees formerly assigned to HealthPartners primary care clinics and the 
enrollees who were assigned to clinics that they could remain in. Because these effects 
remained insignificant from zero, they imply that both voluntary and non-voluntary 
switching had no effect on these outcomes. If voluntary switching was associated with 
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changes in these outcomes, then significant differences between the former 
HealthPartners utilizers and the enrollees initially assigned to clinics in other health 
systems likely would have arisen from the influence of the voluntary switchers in the 
control group.  
 
Similar to the main analysis, the only significant results of this sensitivity analysis were 
for the counts of primary care and specialty care provider visits. For enrollees in the 
sickest health risk quartile, having been assigned to a HealthPartners primary care clinic 
was associated with 1.05 (95% CI:  0.23 to 1.87) more primary care visits after 
enrollment in the MEE plan. Compared to only non-switchers (from the main analysis), 
the former HealthPartners utilizers had 1.01 (95% CI: 0.08 to 1.95) more primary care 
visits. Because this estimated effect remained nearly the same with the inclusion of the 
voluntary switchers in the control group, it is likely that voluntary switching was not 
associated with an increase in primary care visits. If the voluntary switchers had an 
increase in primary care visits, then their inclusion in the control group likely would have 
driven the estimated effect in the sensitivity analysis toward zero. Additionally, having 
been a HealthPartners utilizer was associated with a decrease in visits with specialty care 
providers. On average, enrollees who were initially assigned to HealthPartners primary 
care clinics had 0.32 (95% CI: 0.09 to 0.55) fewer visits with specialty care providers 
than enrollees who were initially assigned to clinics in other health systems. Like the 
main analysis, this effect was attributed to the three sickest health risk quartiles (0.60 
(95% CI: 0.34 to 0.86) fewer visits for enrollees in the 2nd health risk quartile, 0.28 (95% 
CI: -0.02 to 0.58) fewer visits for enrollees in the 3rd health risk quartile, and 0.31 (95% 
CI: 0.03 to 0.59) fewer visits for enrollees in the 4th (sickest) health risk quartile). This 
effect was smaller than the 0.50 (95% CI: 0.22 to 0.78) decrease in visits found in the 
main analysis. The attenuation of the effect size towards zero with the inclusion of the 
voluntary switchers implies that the voluntary switchers also experienced a decrease in 
visits with specialty care providers after enrollment in the MEE plan. To arrive at the 
0.32 effect size of the sensitivity analysis, the voluntary switchers included in the control 
group would needed to have had a similar decrease in specialty care provider visits 
compared to the enrollees who switched out of the HealthPartners primary care clinics. 
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Expressing the 0.32 effect size as the average of the differences in visits (relative to non-
switchers) for the enrollees initially assigned to HealthPartners primary care clinics, 
enrollees originally assigned to non-HealthPartners clinics who did not voluntary switch, 
and enrollees originally assigned to non-HealthPartners clinics who did voluntary 
switched gives the following: 
 
0.32 =  
∆!"#"$#!"#$!%#&! ∗ #!"!"#$!%# +∆!"#"$#!"#$%"&,!"#$%!!! ∗ #!"#$%"&, !"#$%ℎ = 0 +  ∆!"#"$#!"#$%"&,!"#$%!!! ∗ #!"#$%"&, !"#$%ℎ = 1#!"#$%#& + #!"#$%"&, !"#$%ℎ = 0+ #!"#$%"&, !"#$%ℎ = 1  
 
0.32 =  
0.50 ∗ 1151 +0 ∗ 916 +∆!"#"$#!"#$%"&,!"#$%!!! ∗ 6511151+ 916+ 651  
 
Solving this equation yields ΔVisitscontrol, switch=1 = 0.45. 		
With the exception of the difference in primary care visits among enrollees in the sickest 
health risk quartile, this sensitivity analysis implies that the effect of switching primary 
care clinics with enrollment in the limited network MEE plan was similar for both 
voluntary and forced switchers.		
6.2. Difference in Performance after Switching Primary Care Clinics 
 
On average, enrollees who switched primary care clinics obtained care at clinics with 
lower performance pertaining to clinical and behavioral quality as well as patient 
experience than if they had been able to keep their 2011 primary care clinics. Figure 6-6 
presents the differences in 2012 performance for clinical and behavioral quality between 
enrollees’ new primary care clinics and their previous clinics. On average, enrollees 
switched to primary care clinics whose clinical quality performance was 1.3 percentage 
points (95% CI: 0.9 to 1.7) lower than their previous clinics. Similarly, enrollees 
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switched to primary care clinics with 1.1 percentage points (95% CI: 0.8 to 1.6) worse 
performance pertaining to behavioral quality. These results were similar for all health 
risk quartiles. 
 
Results pertaining to patient experience are presented in Figure 6-7. The largest 
difference was for Getting Care When Needed. Enrollees switched to primary care clinics 
where the percent of patients rating the clinics most favorably was 5.4 percentage points 
(95% CI: 4.9 to 5.9) lower on average than their previous clinics. I found smaller 
differences for Provider Communication (0.8 percentage points (95% CI: 0.6 to 1.1)) and 
Courteous and Helpful Staff (1.4 percentage points ((95% CI: 1.2 to 1.6)). I found no 
significant difference between enrollees’ new primary are clinics and their previous 
clinics for Overall Provider Rating, which measures the percent of patients giving the 
clinic an overall rating of 9 or 10 out of 10. These results generally hold for all health risk 
quartiles. 
 
 
6.3. Clinic Attributes Associated with Primary Care Clinic Choices 
 
Table 6-7 presents the coefficients of the multinomial logit models predicting primary 
care clinics choices. The magnitudes of the coefficients are not directly interpretable, but 
their signs indicate the direction of their influence, and the order of the magnitudes 
reflects the relative influence of each explanatory variable. For each of the nested logit 
models, the parameters on the health system inclusive values had a joint significance that 
was different than one, suggesting that enrollees displayed preference heterogeneity over 
the characteristics of primary care clinics by health system. This result implies that the 
non-nested conditional logit model violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives 
assumption and is inconsistent. Changes in the significance and magnitude of the 
coefficients on clinic performance across the different models (Table 6-6) highlight the 
importance of using the nested model. Most prominently, while the coefficients on 
clinical and behavioral performance are strongly significant in the non-nested model, 
their significance decreases in the nested models. When I included a nest for each large 
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health system, I found that clinical performance had no significant effect on the 
probability of choosing a specific primary care clinic. These results suggest that including 
a branch for each large health system is optimal. 
 
HealthPartners had the largest inclusive value in all the models, ranging from 1.25 to 1.57 
(Table 6-7). Intuitively, all of the enrollees had chosen HealthPartners primary care 
clinics under their previous health plan, suggesting they would receive more utility from 
HealthPartners clinics than of clinics in other health systems. However, only 10.7% of 
enrollees chose a HealthPartners primary care clinic in 2012. Comparatively, Allina 
Health and Fairview Health Services had the most assigned enrollees at 28.2% and 
24.5%, respectively, of all enrollees who switched primary care clinics.   
 
The probability of choosing one of the in-network HealthPartners primary care clinics 
increased with health risk as evident by the positive and significant coefficients on the 
health risk quartiles for HealthPartners in the health system choice equation. Using the 
parameter estimates from the last column of Table 6-6, which include a nest for each 
large health system and the patient experience measures as explanatory variables, 
enrollees in the three sickest quartiles were approximately 10 percentage points more 
likely to choose a HealthPartners primary care clinic compared to enrollees in the 
healthiest quartile, at least in reference to the base branch of clinics not in large health 
systems.11 HealthPartners was the only large health system with more than one 
significant health risk quartile coefficient, suggesting that the probability of choosing a 
HealthPartners primary care clinic increased with health risk relative to clinics in the 
other large systems as well. This result may imply that healthier patients are more 
difficult for health systems to retain compared to sicker patients. 
 
Table 6-8 shows the primary care clinic choice probability elasticity with respect to 
clinic performance and other clinic attributes. These estimates are from the full model 
that included a nest for each large health system and the patient experience measures as 																																																								
11 This statistic is the average of the marginal effects of increasing from the healthiest quartile to each of the 
three sickest quartile on the probability of choosing a primary care clinic from within the HealthPartners 
clinics, calculated at the observed values of all enrollees who switched clinics. 
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explanatory variables. I found similar results when I excluded the patient experience 
measures. Because each health system had a different inclusive value, each system has its 
own elasticity set. I found no significant effect of clinics’ clinical or behavioral quality on 
primary care clinic choice. The elasticity for each patient experience measure is 
surprisingly negative, likely implying that enrollees were choosing clinics based on 
attributes other than reported patient experience and by chance selected clinics with lower 
performance, perhaps because they were unaware of how patient experience varied across 
the clinics. The large negative elasticity for Provider Communication is likely reflective 
of low variation in the measure across primary care clinics (range:83% to 95%). I ran 
additional regressions without Provider Communication as an explanatory variable and I 
found that the elasticity with respect to the other explanatory variables did not 
significantly change with its exclusion. 
 
Among the non-performance attributes, distance was a strong predictor of primary care 
clinic choice. A 1% decrease in distance from a primary care clinic was associated with a 
3.0% to 3.7% increase in probability of choosing it, depending on its health system. 
Enrollees tended to select primary care clinics with a higher percentage of specialty care 
physicians. A 1% increase in the percent of specialty care physicians at a primary care 
clinic was associated with between a 0.2% and 0.3% increase in the probability of 
choosing it. In addition, enrollees were more likely to select primary care clinics where 
the patient mix had a lower percentage of patients enrolled in Medicare or MHCP, 
implying enrollees were more likely to choose clinics with a higher percentage of patients 
enrolled in private insurance. Overall, these results suggest that enrollees did not 
emphasize quality when selecting primary care clinics and were influenced by distance to 
the clinic, physician specialty mix, and payor mix. 
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7. Discussion 
 
 
Employers are increasingly offering their employees limited, or narrow, network health 
plans. These health plans attempt to reduce medical expenditures and plan premiums by 
restricting enrollees’ access to specific providers, typically high-cost hospitals and 
specialty care providers, similar to Health Maintenance Organizations and other managed 
care plans that preceded them. Because limited network plans eliminate entire health 
systems and physician practices from their provider networks, enrollees also can lose 
access to primary care providers. In this study, I analyzed the effects of switching 
primary care clinics on costs, utilization, and quality of care after enrollment in a limited 
network plan through the employee benefits plan of the University of Minnesota.  
 
Switching primary care clinics did not affect expenditures of any type or the probabilities 
of having a hospitalization or an ED visit. This result implies that employers offering 
limited network plans may be unlikely to face higher financial costs associated with some 
enrollees switching primary care providers with enrollment in these types of plans. 
Switching primary care clinics after enrollment in the limited network plan did affect the 
amount of enrollees’ outpatient E&M visits with primary care and specialty care 
providers. For enrollees in the three sickest health risk quartiles, switching primary care 
clinics was associated with approximately 0.50 fewer visits with specialty care providers 
in the following year compared to enrollees who did not switch clinics. This effect held 
after controlling for primary care clinic attributes including performance, implying that 
this effect was associated with disruptions of continuity-of-care. For enrollees in the 
sickest health risk quartile, switching primary care clinics also was associated with, on 
average, 1.01 (95% Confidence Interval (CI): 0.08 to 1.95) additional primary care visits. 
I found no similar increase in primary care visits for the remaining health risk quartiles 
With the exception of the effect of switching clinics on primary care visits for the sickest 
enrollees, these effects held for both enrollees who switched out of clinics that were 
excluded in the limited network plan as well as enrollees who voluntarily switched out of 
non-excluded clinics.  
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In general, my results contrast with findings reported in previous literature examining 
costs and utilization after switching providers. Gruber and McKnight (2016) found that 
limited network plan enrollees who switched primary care physicians had, on average, 
less visits with primary care providers, more visits with specialty care providers, and 
higher hospital inpatient expenditures relative to enrollees who kept their primary care 
physicians, although the authors did not investigate heterogeneity by health risk. 
Differences in the study settings used in this analysis and Gruber and McKnight (2016) 
may have generated these differences. Gruber and McKnight’s (2016) setting employed a 
premium holiday that created a large financial incentive to encourage enrollment in 
limited network plans and also did not drop any of their broad network plans. These 
attributes may be atypical of the environments found at most employers and create a 
selection bias that would limit the generalizability of their results. Knowledge pertaining 
to the timing of specialty care provider visits in their population would be beneficial in 
understanding if their results are tied to easier access to specialty care providers 
compared to the enrollees who switched primary care clinics in this study. Furthermore, 
the differences in results may simply be due to using different health plans with different 
provider networks. This occurrence would highlight the difficulty in generalizing studies 
of limited network plans, especially due to variations in provider networks.  
 
My results also generally contrast with the continuity-of-care literature that has found 
individuals who switch providers have more utilization and higher costs, generally 
through increases in hospitalizations and ED visits. The only increase in utilization in this 
study was for primary care visits among the sickest enrollees, which is similar to Raddish 
et al. (1999) and Hennelly and Boxerman (1979) who found individuals had more 
outpatient visits when they switched providers, although the authors did not distinguish 
between primary care and specialty care visits or by health risk. The majority of the 
continuity-of-care literature is based on cross-sectional data and may be susceptible to 
selection bias due to variation in health risk. Individuals who switch providers in these 
studies may appear to have more utilization and worse outcomes not because they 
switched providers but because they are persistently sicker than patients who remain with 
the same providers. In addition, the continuity-of-care literature does not explicitly 
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examine provider changes that occur due to changing health plans. Thus, continuity-of-
care studies may be less likely to examine populations where individuals experience 
provider network changes that limited their access to specific providers.  
 
Enrollees who switched primary care clinics had their largest decrease in specialty care 
visits in the first half-year of enrollment in the limited network plan. This occurrence may 
suggest that primary care providers have a large amount of control over their patients’ 
specialty care utilization, including which providers their patients see, and that a 
continuous primary care physician and patient relationship helps facilitate the process of 
obtaining specialty care. Although enrollees in this study did not have to obtain a referral 
to receive specialty care, primary care providers are frequently responsible for 
recommending specialty care providers to their patients. Large integrated health systems 
dominate the study area of this analysis, and it is likely that primary care providers refer 
their patients to specialty care providers within their own system. On the other hand, if 
the use of specialty care providers was equally distributed among primary care clinics, 
then one would expect that both enrollees who switched clinics and who did not switch 
clinics would have had an equal decrease in specialty care provider visits with enrollment 
in the limited network plan. Thus, two plausible mechanisms for the decrease in specialty 
care visits after switching primary care clinics are: 1) enrollees had difficulty obtaining 
appointments with specialty care providers utilized by their new primary care providers, 
perhaps due to long wait times and 2) primary care providers were reluctant to refer some 
new patients to specialty care providers until after they attempted to manage illnesses 
through primary care. The increase in primary care visits that occurred in early in 2012 
for enrollees in the sickest health risk quartile may be evidence of primary care providers 
substituting primary care for specialty care. Of course, a third possibility is that enrollees 
who switched primary care clinics simply choose to wait to seek specialty care after 
losing access to their usual providers.  
 
The decreased utilization of specialty care providers is a potential negative implication of 
limited network plans for enrollees who must switch primary care providers. Past 
research has found patients often receive higher quality care from specialty care providers 
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for several conditions including diabetes (McAlister et al. 2007), asthma (Schatz et al. 
2005; Vollmer et al. 1997), and drug therapy for myocardial infarction (Ayanian et al. 
1994). My regression results corroborate these studies, indicating that enrollees assigned 
to primary care clinics with higher clinical performance for diabetes and vascular disease 
care had more specialty care visits (0.01 visits per 1 percentage point increase in clinical 
performance (95% CI: 0.0 to 0.03)) and less primary care visits (0.03 visits per 1 
percentage point increase in clinical performance (95% CI: 0.01 to 0.05)). Delayed 
specialty care has also been linked to higher costs for some episodes of care, such as 
musculoskeletal conditions (Nyman et al. 1998). In this analysis, the decrease in specialty 
care visits occurred across multiple specialties and oncology as well as general surgery, 
for which delayed or missed care could have potentially large health consequences, were 
among the specialties with the largest decreases. 
 
Aside from effects tied to disruptions in continuity-of-care, limited network plan 
enrollees who switch primary care providers may receive lower quality of care because 
they switch to relatively low-quality primary care providers, either due to network 
exclusions of high-quality providers or enrollees selecting new providers based on other 
considerations than quality. Although individuals state that they place importance on 
quality of care when selecting providers, they often have difficulty choosing high-quality 
providers (Victoor et al. 2012). On average, enrollees who switched primary care clinics 
in this study obtained care at clinics with lower performance on clinical and behavioral 
quality as well as patient experience than if they had been able to keep their previous 
clinics. However, these differences were relatively small, with the exception of a 5.4 
percentage point average decrease in performance regarding patients’ satisfaction with 
timeliness of care. Of enrollees who switched primary care clinics, distance, payor mix, 
and the percent of specialty physicians had the largest effects on their choices. The 
quality measures had little association with primary care clinic choice. Given that the 
exclusion of the HealthPartners primary care clinics from the limited network plan did 
not have a substantial impact on the average performance of clinics available, these 
results suggest that enrollees did not emphasize quality of care when choosing primary 
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care clinics, perhaps because they were not well informed when making their selections 
or had the perception that all providers in the study area are of high quality.  
 
This analysis may also be applicable to non-employer settings including the widespread 
use of limited network plans in the health insurance marketplaces created as part of the 
ACA. One major concern in the ACA Marketplaces is the tying of cost-sharing subsidies 
for low-income families and individuals (with income at 100% to 250% of the Federal 
Poverty Level) to the second-lower cost tier (i.e. Silver Plans). Sixty-eight percent of 
individuals (8.5 million people) who enrolled in a health plan during 2016 open 
enrollment selected a Silver Plan (ASPE 2016) with 57% of these plans including less 
than 40% of their market areas’ primary care physicians (Polsky and Weiner 2015). 
Furthermore, because of consumers’ price sensitivity and year-to-year changes in which 
insurer offers the lowest cost plan in each state, inertia is relatively low in the ACA 
Marketplaces. In 2016, 43% of all continuous ACA Marketplace enrollees changed plans 
(ASPE 2016) compared to only 13% of individuals with employer-sponsored insurance 
in 2010 (Cunningham 2013). The desire for lower premiums could make primary care 
provider switching a recurrent event for price sensitive consumers in these markets. 
 
The results of this study support the need to provide individuals with information 
pertaining to the characteristics of provider networks and the possible consequences of 
switching primary care providers. In particular, it will be important to notify potential 
limited network plan enrollees that they may be less likely to obtain specialty care if their 
current clinics or health systems are excluded. Consumers often have difficulty 
comparing provider networks across health plans (Peters and Holahan 2014) due to low 
health insurance literacy and an inability to access up-to-date provider directories 
(AcademyHealth 2014). For these reasons, consumers may select a limited network plan 
without realizing a commonly visited provider will be out-of-network. Finding new 
methods of displaying provider network information will be beneficial. Behavioral 
economic experiments have been useful in determining how to properly display quality 
and cost ratings to best inform consumers (Greene, Hibbard, and Sacks 2016). Similar 
experiments focusing on network availability could benefit marginal consumers in 
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making well-informed decisions, while still keeping limited network plans available as 
low-cost options.  
 
 
7.1. Limitations 
 
This study has limitations that constrain it scope and generalizability. First, I was limited 
to one employer and one limited network plan, Minnesota is dominated by large, 
integrated delivery systems and is generally considered to be one the top-ranking states in 
terms of quality of care and integration (Moody and Silow-Carroll 2009). Although I 
found that enrollees switched to primary care clinics of lower quality than their original 
clinics, their new clinics often were still in large, integrated health systems, which may 
have been of relatively high quality. This aspect may limit this study’s external validity 
when compared to areas of relatively lower quality or lower states of integration. 
However, recent trends have shown an increase in the rates of mergers and acquisitions 
throughout the U.S. leading to more integrated health systems and concentrated markets, 
especially in urban areas (Baker, Bundorf, and Kessler 2014; Christianson, Carlin, and 
Warwick 2014). The recent proliferation of accoutable care organizaitons may have 
accelerated this integration between hospitals and physicians. These trends suggest that 
other markets are becoming more like the Twin Cities, thus allowing for the results of 
analyses conducted in the Twin Cities to be applicable to other areas.  
 
Second, the health system exclusion of the limited network plan in this study raises 
questions pertaining to the external validity. In this study, the exclusion was of a large, 
integrated health system, and thus this analysis is most generalizable to limited network 
plans with a similar exclusion and may be less generalizable to plans with even narrower 
provider networks. The exclusion of a large health system is becoming more 
commonplace as employers aim to curb their administrative health plan costs. The Kaiser 
Family Foundation reported that 9% of employers (with 50 or more employees) offering 
health insurance had an insurer drop a hospital or health system in 2015 to reduce costs 
(KFF/HRET 2015), up from 6% in 2014 (KFF/HRET 2014). In addition, the external 
		 68 
validity of this study is potentially diminished because the health system excluded is not 
considered a high-cost system. Enrollees who had been utilizing the excluded primary 
care clinics may have switched to clinics in health systems with similar or even higher 
prices. In particular, this feature could place an upward bias on the result that switching 
primary care clinics was not associated with an increase in expenditures, at least in 
comparison to limited network plans that specifically exclude high-cost health systems. 
However, similar effects existed between enrollees forced out of the excluded primary 
care clinics and enrollees who voluntarily switched out of non-excluded clinics. This 
result implies that the estimated effects were tied to the act of switching clinics and not 
driven by the price differences between the excluded and non-excluded providers. Still, 
one should take caution in making broad generalizations. There is no agreed upon 
definition of what constitutes a limited provider network and variation in the types and 
number of providers included as well as excluded from these networks may influence the 
care enrollees receive. It will be important for researchers to recognize and state these 
details in order to compare studies and generalize results. 	
 
Third, I was unable to determine the mechanism explaining why enrollees who switched 
primary care clinics had fewer visits with specialty providers. In particular, it will be 
important to distinguish if the decrease in visits with specialty care providers occurred 
because of enrollees’ difficulty in obtaining appointments, they had trouble receiving 
referrals from primary care providers, or if patients delayed their own specialty care for 
other reasons, such as waiting to seeing their new primary care provider. Understanding 
why the decrease in specialty care provider visits occurred likely will require qualitative 
analysis, such as interviewing limited network plan enrollees and providers. 
 
A fourth major limitation of this study is the lack of individual measures of quality or 
patient experience. While I found enrollees switched to lower quality primary care 
clinics, I was unable to determine if enrollees did in fact experience lower clinical quality 
or satisfaction. Future studies examining individual quality measures, such as 
Hemoglobin A1c levels for patients with diabetes, will be valuable in determine the effect 
of provider switching and limited networks on enrollee wellbeing. 
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7.2. Conclusion 
 
In this study I estimated the effect of switching primary care clinics after enrollment in a 
limited network plan through the benefits plan of the University of Minnesota. Switching 
primary care clinics was not associated with an increase in expenditures, hospitalizations, 
or ED visits, implying that employers offering limited network plans may be unlikely to 
face higher financial costs associated with some enrollees switching primary care 
providers. Switching primary care clinics was associated with a decrease in specialty care 
provider visits, highlighting that the clinics had a large amount of control over care that 
occurred downstream from primary care providers. In addition, enrollees obtained care at 
primary care clinics with significantly worse performance on publicly reported quality 
measures than if they had remained in their previous clinics, although these differences 
were relatively small. For individuals who would have to switch primary care clinics, 
enrollment in a limited network plan may not be appropriate if they are in need of timely 
specialty care. These results support the need to provide potential enrollees of limited 
network plans with information pertaining to the characteristics of provider networks and 
the possible consequences of switching primary care providers in order to allow them to 
make well-informed decisions regarding their health plans choices.  
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Table R-1 Definitions of Performance Measures 
Clinic Quality   
Clinical Quality  The average clinic performance on hemoglobin A1c, blood pressure, and low-density 
lipoprotein-cholesterol from the diabetes care measures and blood pressure and low-
density lipoprotein-cholesterol from the vascular disease care measures. Each 
individual measure is the percent of the relevant patient population achieving the 
treatment goal. 
   
Behavioral Quality  The average clinic performance on aspirin use and tobacco free status from the 
diabetes care measures and aspirin use and tobacco free status from the vascular 
disease care measures. Each individual measure is the percent of the relevant patient 
population achieving the treatment goal. 
   
Patient Experience   
Getting Care When Needed  Percent of questions pertaining to receiving timely care answered with the most 
favorable response from surveyed patients (all-cause). 
   
Provider Communication  Percent of questions pertaining to provider communication answered with the most 
favorable response from surveyed patients (all-cause). 
   
Courteous and Helpful Staff  Percent of questions pertaining to the courteous and helpfulness of the clinic’s office 
staff answered with the most favorable response from surveyed patients (all-cause). 
   
Overall Provider Rating  Percent of surveyed patients (all-cause) rating their overall provider experience a 9 or 
10 out of 10. 
Notes: Detailed descriptions of the reported performance measures are avaiable in Section 4.2. The specific patient experience 
questions asked of survey respondents are avabile in Table A-5. 
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Table 3-1 Health Plans Offered by the University of Minnesota UPlan, 2011 
   Medica  
  HealthPartners 
Elect/ 
Essential 
Choice 
Insights 
Choice 
Regional 
Choice 
National 
Health 
Savings 
Account 
Campus Availability  All  Twin Cities 
and Duluth  
All  All excluding 
Twin Cities 
and Duluth 
All  All  
        
HealthPartners Primary Care 
Clinics Excluded (see Table A-1 
for details) 
 None 18 of 26  None 
 (all available 
in Tier 1) 
14 of 26 14 of 26 14 of 26 
        
HealthPartners Specialty Care 
Providers Excluded (see Table A-1 
for details) 
 None All except eye 
clinics 
None All 
behavioral 
health clinics 
All 
behavioral 
health clinics 
All 
behavioral 
health clinics 
        
2011 Adult Enrollment (%)  11,648 
(36%) 
12,162  
(38%) 
1,687 
 (5%) 
2,467 
(8%) 
3,960  
(12%) 
365  
(1%) 
        
Mean Health Risk Scorea (SD)  1.07  
(1.06) 
0.89  
(0.83) 
1.02  
(0.95) 
0.93  
(0.86) 
1.20  
(1.28) 
0.76  
(0.62) 
        
Individual 2-Week Pay Period 
Premiumb  
 $264.20 $253.60 $271.80 $318.10 $274.70 $253.90 
Employee Contribution  $36.00 $25.40 $43.60 $25.40 $46.50 $25.70 
          
Family 2-Week Pay Period 
Premiumb 
 $757.70 $728.90 $780.90 $915.10 $789.40 $729.60 
Employee Contribution  $138.10 $109.30 $161.30 $109.30 $169.80 $110.00 
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In-Network Deductible  None None None None None $1,500 
individual/ 
$3,000 family 
        
Physician Visit Co-Payment  $11 $11 Tier 1: $15  
Tier 2: $30  
Tier 3: $50 
$11 $25 90% after 
deductible 
        
Emergency Care Co-Payment  $75 $75 $75 $75 $75 90% after 
deductible 
        
Hospital Care Co-Payment  100% 
coverage 
100% 
coverage 
Tier 1: 100% 
Coverage 
Tier 2/3: $200 
100% 
coverage 
$200 90% after 
deductible 
        
Generic Drug Co-Payment  $8 $8 $8 $8 $8 90% after 
deductible 
Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation. 
 
a Health risk score calculated using the risk-adjustment algorithm of the Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System based on 
ICD-9 codes and prescribed medicines. The measure is indexed to be 1.00 in the full UPlan population. Larger risk scores signify 
greater health risk. 
 
b The Medica Elect/Essential plan premiums varied by campus. Premiums shown are for the Twin Cities campuses.  
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Table 3-2 Difference in Performance of Primary Care Clinics in Enrollees’ Market Areas by Health Plan, 2012 
  
Broad Network of HealthPartners Limited Network of Medica Elect/Essential 
Number of Primary Care Clinics (SD) 
 
231.1 220.8 
  
(51.5) (49.8) 
Mean Performance    
  Clinical Quality (SD) 
 
72.0% 71.7% 
  
(0.7) (0.7) 
  Behavioral Quality (SD) 
 
91.6% 91.5% 
  
(0.5) (0.5) 
  Getting Care When Needed (SD) 
 
58.7% 58.3% 
  
(0.5) (0.4) 
  Provider Communication (SD) 
 
90.8% 90.7% 
  
(0.2) (0.2) 
  Courteous and Helpful Staff (SD) 
 
91.1% 91.0% 
  
(0.3) (0.3) 
  Overall Provider Rating (SD)  79.1% 79.2% 
  (0.3) (0.4) 
Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation. 
 
Notes: Includes 1,151 UPlan enrollees who enrolled in the Medica Elect/Essential health plan in 2012 and whose previous primary 
care clinic is exclued in the Medica Elect/Essential plan. An urban (rural) enrollee’s market area is defined as 12.5-mile (17.5-mile) 
radius from the center of their zip code of residence. All performance measures calculated from Minnesota Community Measurement 
publicly reported data. Clinical and Behavioral Quality represent the percent of patients meeting treatment goals for diabetes and 
vascular disease care. Getting Care When Needed, Provider Communication, Courteous and Helpful Staff, and Overall Provider 
Rating measures calculated from survey responses and represent the percent of patients giving the clinic the most favorable rating. 
Full descriptions of these measures are available in Section 4.2. The specific patient experience questions asked of survey respondents 
are avabile in Table A-5. 
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Table 4-1 Characteristics of 2012 UPlan Enrollees Unmatched to 2008 through 2011 Claims 
         
  
 
All 2012 UPlan Adult Enrollees 
 
Unable to Crosswalk from 2012 to Earlier Claims 
Number of Enrollees 
 
33,366  7,113 
Mean Age (SD) 
 
42.5  37.5 
  
(14.3)  (12.8) 
   
 
 Percent Female 
 
53.6%  49.8% 
   
 
 Mean Health Risk Scorea (SD) 
 
1.02  0.93 
  
(1.02)  (0.99) 
   
 
 Percent by Health Plan  
   Medica Elect/Essential 
 
60.1%  64.7% 
  Medica Choice Insights 
 
19.4%  13.6% 
  Medica Choice National 
 
11.0%  11.5% 
  Medica Choice Regional 
 
8.0%  7.8% 
  Medica Health Savings Account   1.5%  2.6% 
Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation. 
 
a Health risk score calculated using the risk-adjustment algorithm of the Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System based on 
ICD-9 codes and prescribed medicine. The measure is indexed to be 1.00 in the full UPlan population. Larger risk scores signify 
greater health risk. 
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Table 5-1 Characteristics of New Medica Elect/Essential Enrollees, 2012 
            
Not Assigned  
to a Primary Care Clinic   
Assigned to a Primary Care Clinic  
with Missing Data 
  
 
New Medica 
Elect/Essential 
Enrollees 
 
Assigned to a 
Primary Care 
Clinic in  
2011 and 2012 
 
No Primary 
Care Visits in 
2011 or 2012 
 
Undeterminable 
Assignment in 
2011 or 2012 
 
Clinical or 
Behavioral 
Performance Not 
Reported in  
2011 or 2012 
 
Patient Experience 
Performance Not 
Reported in  
2011 or 2012 
Number of Adult 
Enrollees 
 
5,194 2,718 1,739 737 342 817 
  
           
Mean Age (SD) 
 
43.9  46.2  41.0  42.6  41.8  43.7 
  
(13.5)  (12.9)  (13.6)  (13.8)  (11.9)  (12.5) 
  
           
Percent Female 
 
54.0%  62.5%  40.2%  54.1%  79.5%  62.5% 
  
           
Mean Health Risk 
Scorea (SD) 
 
1.01 
(0.97) 
 1.22 
(1.10) 
 0.65 
(0.45) 
 1.06 
(1.09) 
 1.07 
(0.87) 
 1.07 
(0.98) 
Abbreviation: SD, standard deviation. 
 
a Health risk score calculated using the risk-adjustment algorithm of the Chronic Illness and Disability Payment System based on 
ICD-9 codes and prescribed medicine. The measure is indexed to be 1.00 in the full UPlan population. Larger risk scores signify 
greater health risk. 
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Table 6-1 Coefficients for Probit Models Predicting the Probabilities of Having a Hospitalization or an Emergency Department  
Visit 
    Had a Hospitalization   Had an ED Visit 
  
Base Models 
Health Risk  
Interactions 
 
Base Models 
Health Risk 
Interactions 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Health System Fixed Effects 
 
No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Primary Care Clinic Performance 
 
No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
 
 
         
Treatment Effect 
 
         
  Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 
 
0.08 0.23 0.08 0.22  0.17 0.08 0.08 -0.01 
 
 
(0.14) (0.19) (0.18) (0.22)  (0.11) (0.15) (0.18) (0.22) 
Differential Treatment Effects by Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)/2nd 
Quartile for Hospitalization, 1st Quartile (Healthiest) for ED Visits) 
     
  Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
       0.14 
(0.18) 
0.15 
(0.19) 
             Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  0.11 
(0.21) 
0.05 
(0.22) 
   -0.01 
(0.19) 
-0.09 
(0.21) 
             Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
  -0.06 
(0.18) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
   0.12 
(0.19) 
0.20 
(0.20) 
 
 
         
Treatment Group Indicator 
 
         
  Switched Clinic in 2012 
 
-0.25** -0.42*** -0.24** -0.41***  -0.26*** -0.23** -0.26*** -0.23** 
 
 
(0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14)  (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) 
Demographics 
 
         
  Age (per year) 
 
-0.006*** -0.008*** -0.006*** -0.008***  -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** -0.007*** 
 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
  Female 
 
0.05 0.02 0.05 0.02  -0.13*** -0.13*** -0.12*** -0.13*** 
 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06)  (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Health Risk Quartile Effects (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)/2nd Quartile for Hospitalization, 
1st Quartile (Healthiest) for ED Visits) 
     
  2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
     0.20*** 0.16** 0.22*** 0.17** 
 
 
     (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) 
  3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
0.32*** 0.30*** 0.26*** 0.23***  0.35*** 0.30*** 0.43*** 0.36*** 
 
 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
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  4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
0.93*** 0.94*** 0.96*** 1.96***  0.61*** 0.58*** 0.64*** 0.57*** 
 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.08)  (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) 
Primary Care Clinic Performance 
 
         
  Clinical Quality (per 1 percentage point) 
 
 -0.006  -0.006   -0.008  -0.008 
 
 
 (0.008)  (0.008)   (0.006)  (0.007) 
  Behavioral Quality  (per 1 percentage point) 
 
 0.01  0.01   0.004  0.004 
 
 
 (0.01)  (0.01)   (0.008)  (0.008) 
Year Effects (Reference = Year 2009) 
 
         
  Year 2010 
 
-0.14 -0.22 -0.14 -0.22  -0.11 -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 
 
 
(0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16)  (0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.13) 
  Year 2011 
 
-0.12 -0.18 -0.11 -0.17  -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.01 
 
 
(0.10) (0.16) (0.10) (0.16)  (0.07) (0.13) (0.07) (0.13) 
  Year 2012 
 
-0.17* -0.27* -0.17* -0.27*  -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 
 
 
(0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14)  (0.08) (0.12) (0.08) (0.12) 
Pre-intervention Treatment Group-Year Interactions         
  Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 
 
0.27* 0.37** 0.22 0.26  0.09 0.08 0.14 0.04 
 
 
(0.14) (0.17) (0.17) (0.21)  (0.12) (0.14) (0.17) (0.21) 
  Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 
 
0.20 0.29* 0.25 0.32*  0.15 0.18 0.32** 0.32* 
 
 
(0.14) (0.16) (0.16) (0.18)  (0.10) (0.13) (0.15) (0.17) 
Pre-intervention Treatment Group-Year-Health Risk Quartile Interactions (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)/2nd 
Quartile for Hospitalization, 1st Quartile (Healthiest) for ED Visits) 
   
  Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
       -0.11 
(0.18) 
-0.09 
(0.21) 
             Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  0.23 
(0.20) 
0.32 
(0.22) 
   -0.11 
(0.20) 
0.05 
(0.23) 
             Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
  -0.003 
(0.168) 
0.08 
(0.18) 
   0.04 
(0.19) 
0.19 
(0.21) 
             Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
       -0.13 
(0.15) 
-0.09 
(0.16) 
             Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  0.05 
(0.19) 
0.09 
(0.19) 
   -0.31* 
(0.17) 
-0.25 
(0.17) 
             Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
  -0.18 
(0.16) 
-0.02 
(0.18) 
   -0.29* 
(0.17) 
0.22 
(0.17) 
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Constant 
 
-1.52*** -2.13*** -1.52*** -2.13**  -0.91*** -1.27* -0.94*** -1.27* 
 
 
(0.13) (0.91) (0.13) (0.91)  (0.12) (0.75) (0.13) (0.75) 
 
 
         
Enrollee-year Observations 
 
7,499 6,879 7,499 6,879  7,499 6,894 7,499 6,894 
Unique Enrollees   2,067 1,879 2,067 1,879  2,067 1,885 2,067 1,885 
Abbreviation: ED, Emergency Department. 
 
Notes: Includes former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either switched 
primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remained in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916). All models 
are probit. Table presents coefficients and not marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by enrollee.  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-2 Coefficients for Negative Binomial Models Predicting Visits with Primary Care and Specialty Care Providers 
    Primary Care Provider Visits   Specialty Care Provider Visits 
  
Base Models 
Health Risk  
Interactions 
 
Base Models 
Health Risk 
Interactions 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Health System Fixed Effects 
 
No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
Primary Care Clinic Performance 
 
No Yes No Yes  No Yes No Yes 
  
         
Treatment Effect 
 
         
  Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 
 
0.17*** 0.11 0.004 -0.06  -0.21** -0.34*** -0.37** -0.52** 
  
(0.06) (0.08) (0.105) (0.13)  (0.09) (0.13) (0.18) (0.21) 
Differential Treatment Effects by Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest))      
  Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *      
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  0.15 
(0.11) 
0.12 
(0.11) 
   0.18 
(0.18) 
0.18 
(0.19) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *    
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  0.14 
(0.11) 
0.15 
(0.12) 
   0.28 
(0.19) 
0.26 
(0.20) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
  0.28** 
(0.12) 
0.33*** 
(0.12) 
   0.12 
(0.18) 
0.19 
(0.20) 
  
         
Treatment Group Indicator 
 
         
  Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 
 
-0.15*** -0.10 -0.15*** -0.10  -0.00 0.18 -0.002 0.18 
  
(0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.07)  (0.08) (0.11) (0.077) (0.11) 
Demographics 
 
         
  Age (per year) 
 
-0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005*** -0.005***  0.005** 0.004* 0.005** 0.004* 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)  (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
 Female 
 
0.24*** 0.23*** 0.24*** 0.23***  0.12** 0.10* 0.12** 0.09* 
  
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)  (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Health Risk Quartile Effects (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest))      
  2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
0.14*** 0.14*** 0.12** 0.13**  0.14** 0.15** 0.05 0.07 
  
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)  (0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
 3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
0.32*** 0.32*** 0.32*** 0.31***  0.55*** 0.58*** 0.46*** 0.50*** 
  
(0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) 
 4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
0.69*** 0.69*** 0.67*** 0.67***  1.08*** 1.09*** 1.07*** 1.06*** 
  
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)  (0.07) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) 
Primary Care Clinic Performance 
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  Clinical Quality (per 1 percentage point) 
 
 -0.015***  -0.015***   0.009*  0.009* 
  
 (0.004)  (0.004)   (0.005)  (0.005) 
 Behavioral Quality  (per 1 percentage point) 
 
 -0.004  -0.004   -0.012*  -0.012* 
  
 (0.005)  (0.005)   (0.007)  (0.007) 
Year Effects (Reference = Year 2009) 
 
         
  Year 2010 
 
-0.09** 0.10 -0.09** 0.10  0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03 
  
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08)  (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.11) 
 Year 2011 
 
-0.06 0.13* -0.06 0.13*  0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 
  
(0.04) (0.08) (0.04) (0.08)  (0.06) (0.11) (0.06) (0.10) 
 Year 2012 
 
-0.11** 0.02 -0.11** 0.02  -0.005 0.03 -0.001 0.03 
  
(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07)  (0.066) (0.10) (0.067) (0.10) 
Pre-intervention Treatment Group-Year Interactions 
 
         
  Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 
 
0.043 -0.039 0.053 -0.034  -0.020 -0.021 -0.076 -0.039 
  
(0.059) (0.073) (0.106) (0.123)  (0.085) (0.113) (0.170) (0.201) 
 Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 
 
0.081 -0.001 0.129 0.044  0.077 0.082 -0.12 -0.11 
  
(0.056) (0.069) (0.087) (0.098)  (0.083) (0.106) (0.14) (0.16) 
Pre-intervention Treatment Group-Year-Health Risk Quartile Interactions (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest))    
  Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *   
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  0.05 
(0.11) 
0.04 
(0.12) 
   0.12 
(0.18) 
0.06 
(0.20) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
     3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  -0.01 
(0.13) 
0.04 
(0.13) 
   0.14 
(0.19) 
0.10 
(0.21) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
  -0.10 
(0.13) 
-0.12 
(0.14) 
   -0.05 
(0.18) 
-0.08 
(0.20) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  -0.03 
(0.09) 
-0.04 
(0.09) 
   0.34** 
(0.14) 
0.34** 
(0.14) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
     3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  -0.09 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
   0.27* 
(0.16) 
0.24 
(0.16) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
     4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
  -0.07 
(0.10) 
-0.07 
(0.10) 
   0.05 
(0.16) 
0.06 
(0.16) 
           Constant 
 
0.78*** 0.98** 0.80*** 0.85*  -0.45*** 0.87 -0.39*** 0.87 
  
(0.08) (0.46) (0.08) (0.47)  (0.12) (0.61) (0.12) (0.61) 
  
         
Enrollee-year Observations 
 
7,499 6,944 7,499 6,944  7,499 6,944 7,499 6,944 
Unique Enrollees   2,067 1,901 2,067 1,901  2,067 1,901 2,067 1,901 
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Notes: Includes former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either switched 
primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remained in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916). Primary care 
provider visits modeled using a zero-truncated negative binomial regression. Specialty care provider visits modeled using a negative 
binomial regression. Table presents coefficients and not marginal effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by enrollee.  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-3 Changes in Specialty Care Provider Visits after Switching Primary Care Clinics For Enrollees in the Three Sickest Health 
Risk Quartiles, by Specialty Type 
Change in Visits For Enrollees Who Switched Primary 
Care Clinics  
(First 7 Months of 2012 minus First 7 Months of 2011)  
Difference-in-Differences between Enrollees Who 
Switched Clinics and Enrollees Who Did Not Switch 
(First 7 Months of 2012 minus First 7 Months of 2011) 
Specialty Change in Visits 
 
Specialty Change in Visits per Enrollee 
Dermatology -33 
 
Dermatology -0.056 
Otolaryngology -26 
 
Podiatry -0.038 
Oncology -25 
 
General Surgery -0.035 
General Surgery -23 
 
Chiropractor -0.029 
Urology -15 
 
Otolaryngology -0.024 
Pulmonology -14 
 
Rheumatology -0.023 
Podiatry -13 
 
Pulmonology -0.021 
Orthopedics -11 
 
Allergy/Immunology -0.015 
Allergy/Immunology -9 
 
Oncology -0.014 
Chiropractor -9 
 
Ophthalmology -0.012 
Psychiatry -8 
 
Orthopedics 0.003 
Ophthalmology -7 
 
Cardiology 0.005 
Rheumatology -6 
 
Endocrinology 0.005 
Endocrinology -5 
 
Urology 0.006 
Cardiology -4 
 
Obstetrics/Gynecology 0.010 
Neurology 4 
 
Psychiatry 0.011 
Obstetrics/Gynecology 12 
 
Neurology 0.025 
Notes: Includes former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012, who were in the three 
sickest health risk quartiles, and who either switched primary care clinics due to network restrictions (N = 823) or who remained in the 
same non-excluded clinic (N = 664). Includes all specialties with at least 10 visits from January 2011 through July 2011 by enrollees 
who switched primary care clinics in 2012. 
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Table 6-4 Coefficients for Generalized Linear Models Predicting Total Expenditures 
    Total Expenditures 
  
Base Models Health Risk Interactions 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
Health System Fixed Effects 
 
No Yes No Yes 
Primary Care Clinic Performance 
 
No Yes No Yes 
  
    
Treatment Effect 
 
    
  Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 
 
-0.10 -0.05 -0.17 -0.14 
  
(0.18) (0.24) (0.18) (0.25) 
Differential Treatment Effects by Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest))   
  Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  0.15 
(0.14) 
0.12 
(0.15) 
  
    
 Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  0.09 
(0.15) 
0.12 
(0.16) 
  
    
 Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
  0.04 
(0.20) 
0.09 
(0.20) 
  
    
Treatment Group Indicator 
 
    
  Switched Clinic in 2012 
 
-0.26*** -0.30** -0.26*** -0.30** 
  
(0.08) (0.13) (0.08) (0.13) 
Demographics 
 
    
  Age (per year) 
 
0.006 0.003 0.006 0.003 
  
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) 
 Female 
 
0.10 0.07 0.10 0.07 
  
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Health Risk Quartile Effects (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest))    
  2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
0.34*** 0.36*** 0.27*** 0.29** 
  
(0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.11) 
 3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
0.78*** 0.78*** 0.75*** 0.72*** 
  
(0.09) (0.10) (0.11) (0.12) 
 4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
1.58*** 1.58*** 1.61*** 1.59*** 
  
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.12) 
Primary Care Clinic Performance 
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  Clinical Quality (per 1 percentage point) 
 
 -0.01  -0.01 
  
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
 Behavioral Quality  (per 1 percentage point) 
 
 0.02*  0.02* 
  
 (0.01)  (0.01) 
Year Effects (Reference = Year 2009) 
 
    
  Year 2010 
 
0.03 -0.02 0.03 -0.03 
  
(0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14) 
 Year 2011 
 
0.05 0.001 0.05 -0.0004 
  
(0.08) (0.144) (0.08) (0.1439) 
 Year 2012 
 
0.06 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 
  
(0.16) (0.18) (0.16) (0.18) 
Pre-intervention Treatment Group-Year Interactions 
 
    
  Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 
 
0.05 0.16 0.20 0.29 
  
(0.10) (0.14) (0.22) (0.27) 
 Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 
 
0.07 0.18 -0.10 -0.04 
  
(0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.18) 
Pre-intervention Treatment Group-Year-Health Risk Quartile Interactions (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest))   
  Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  -0.02 
(0.23) 
-0.02 
(0.27) 
       Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  -0.09 
(0.24) 
-0.05 
(0.27) 
  
    
 Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
  -0.29 
(0.25) 
-0.27 
(0.28) 
       Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  0.38** 
(0.15) 
0.40** 
(0.16) 
       Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
  0.26 
(0.19) 
0.33* 
(0.19) 
       Switched Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
  0.01 
(0.20) 
0.08 
(0.20) 
      Constant 
 
7.73*** 5.58*** 7.74*** 5.54*** 
  
(0.20) (0.84) (0.22) (0.85) 
  
    
Enrollee-year Observations 
 
7,497 6,942 7,497 6,942 
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Unique Enrollees   2,067 1,901 2,067 1,901 
Notes: Includes former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either switched 
primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remained in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916). All models 
estimated with generalized linear models using a log link and Poisson variance structure. Table presents coefficients and not marginal 
effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by enrollee.  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-5 Coefficients for Generalized Linear Models Predicting Non-Emergency Department Outpatient and Prescription Drug 
Expenditures 
    Non-ED Outpatient Expenditures   Prescription Drug Expenditures 
  
Base Models 
Health Risk 
Interactions 
 
Base Models 
Health Risk 
Interactions 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Health System Fixed Effects 
 
No Yes No Yes 
 
No Yes No Yes 
Primary Care Clinic Performance 
 
No Yes No Yes 
 
No Yes No Yes 
           Treatment Effect 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 
 
0.02 -0.18 0.10 -0.14 
 
0.09 0.12 -0.16 -0.11 
  
(0.12) (0.28) (0.15) (0.28) 
 
(0.14) (0.19) (0.26) (0.32) 
Differential Treatment Effects by Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
       Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 * 
     2nd Health Risk Quartile 
   
0.01 
(0.13) 
-0.003 
(0.137) 
   
0.15 
(0.27) 
0.11 
(0.29) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
-0.07 
(0.13) 
-0.01 
(0.14) 
   
0.18 
(0.30) 
0.15 
(0.32) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
-0.17 
(0.22) 
-0.07 
(0.21) 
   
0.35 
(0.31) 
0.32 
(0.31) 
           Treatment Group Indicator 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 
 
-0.21*** -0.03 -0.21*** -0.02 
 
-0.36*** -0.48*** -0.37*** -0.48*** 
  
(0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.11) 
 
(0.10) (0.15) (0.10) (0.15) 
Demographics 
            Age (per year) 
 
0.01* 0.01 0.01* 0.01 
 
-0.01 -0.01** -0.01 -0.01** 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Female 
 
0.14* 0.11 0.14* 0.11 
 
-0.05 -0.05 -0.05 -0.05 
  
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) 
 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) 
Health Risk Quartile Effects (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
       2nd Health Risk Quartile 
 
0.20** 0.23** 0.18* 0.21** 
 
0.43*** 0.44*** 0.39*** 0.38*** 
  
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.12) (0.12) 
 3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
0.54*** 0.55*** 0.53*** 0.53*** 
 
1.12*** 1.12*** 1.05*** 1.03*** 
  
(0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.12) (0.13) 
 4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
1.09*** 1.10*** 1.17*** 1.17*** 
 
2.04*** 2.01*** 1.94*** 1.88*** 
  
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.10) 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) 
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Primary Care Clinic Performance 
            Clinical Quality (per 1 percentage point) 
  
-0.002 
 
-0.003 
  
0.003 
 
0.003 
   
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
  
(0.010) 
 
(0.010) 
 Behavioral Quality  (per 1 percentage point) 
  
0.005 
 
0.005 
  
0.02 
 
0.02 
   
(0.010) 
 
(0.008) 
  
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year Effects (Reference = Year 2009) 
            Year 2010 
 
0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 
 
-0.07 -0.24 -0.07 -0.24 
  
(0.06) (0.14) (0.06) (0.14) 
 
(0.05) (0.16) (0.05) (0.17) 
 Year 2011 
 
0.04 0.05 0.04 0.05 
 
-0.13** -0.31** -0.13** -0.30** 
  
(0.08) (0.12) (0.09) (0.12) 
 
(0.06) (0.15) (0.06) (0.15) 
 Year 2012 
 
-0.07 -0.03 -0.07 -0.04 
 
-0.12 -0.27* -0.12 -0.26* 
  
(0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.11) 
 
(0.09) (0.15) (0.09) (0.15) 
Pre-intervention Treatment Group-Year Interactions 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 
 
0.00 0.01 0.23 0.25 
 
0.07 0.27* -0.03 0.03 
  
(0.09) (0.13) (0.24) (0.30) 
 
(0.08) (0.14) (0.16) (0.20) 
 Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 
 
0.07 0.07 -0.02 -0.05 
 
0.17 0.35** -0.14 -0.04 
  
(0.11) (0.13) (0.14) (0.16) 
 
(0.11) (0.16) (0.17) (0.19) 
Pre-intervention Treatment Group-Year-Health Risk Quartile Interactions (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
    Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
   
-0.14 
(0.24) 
-0.17 
(0.29) 
   
0.04 
(0.17) 
0.13 
(0.19) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
-0.15 
(0.27) 
-0.12 
(0.31) 
   
0.29 
(0.21) 
0.39* 
(0.23) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
-0.42 
(0.28) 
-0.44 
(0.31) 
   
0.06 
(0.20) 
0.24 
(0.22) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
     2nd Health Risk Quartile 
   
0.24* 
(0.13) 
0.24* 
(0.14) 
   
0.24 
(0.19) 
0.28 
(0.20) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
0.21 
(0.19) 
0.26 
(0.19) 
   
0.19 
(0.19) 
0.25 
(0.20) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
-0.10 
(0.20) 
-0.05 
(0.19) 
   
0.43* 
(0.24) 
0.54** 
(0.24) 
           Constant 
 
7.21*** 6.49*** 7.18*** 6.43*** 
 
6.57*** 2.54** 6.65*** 2.61** 
  
(0.21) (0.71) (0.23) (0.70) 
 
(0.18) (1.11) (0.20) (1.13) 
           Enrollee-year Observations 
 
7,499 6,944 7,499 6,944 
 
7,499 6,944 7,499 6,944 
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Unique Enrollees   2,067 1,901 2,067 1,901   2,067 1,901 2,067 1,901 
Abbreviation: ED, Emergency Department. 
 
Notes: Includes former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either switched 
primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remained in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916). All models 
estimated with generalized linear models using a log link and Poisson variance structure. Table presents coefficients and not marginal 
effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by enrollee.  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-6 Coefficients for Generalized Linear Models Predicting Hospital Inpatient and Emergency Department Expenditures 
    Hospital Inpatient Expenditures   ED Expenditures 
  
Base Models 
Health Risk 
Interactions 
 
Base Models 
Health Risk 
Interactions 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
Health System Fixed Effects 
 
No Yes No Yes 
 
No Yes No Yes 
Primary Care Clinic Performance 
 
No Yes No Yes 
 
No Yes No Yes 
           Treatment Effect 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 
 
-0.57 -0.11 -0.67 -0.34 
 
-0.06 -0.09 -0.33 -0.34 
  
(0.47) (0.36) (0.47) (0.42) 
 
(0.16) (0.17) (0.25) (0.26) 
Differential Treatment Effects by Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
       Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
        
0.24 
(0.25) 
0.21 
(0.24) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
-0.10 
(0.38) 
0.29 
(0.38) 
   
0.16 
(0.25) 
0.10 
(0.25) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2012 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
0.18 
(0.41) 
0.24 
(0.38) 
   
0.46 
(0.29) 
0.45 
(0.29) 
           Treatment Group Indicator 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 
 
0.19 0.02 0.19 0.02 
 
0.02 -0.01 0.02 -0.02 
  
(0.20) (0.23) (0.20) (0.22) 
 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.13) (0.17) 
Demographics 
            Age (per year) 
 
0.02*** 0.02*** 0.02*** 0.01*** 
 
-0.01** -0.01* -0.01** -0.01* 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.00) 
 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
 Female 
 
-0.01 -0.04 -0.008 -0.04 
 
-0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.03 
  
(0.15) (0.12) (0.151) (0.12) 
 
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Health Risk Quartile Effects (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
       2nd Health Risk Quartile 
      
0.08 0.10 0.04 0.07 
       
(0.11) (0.11) (0.15) (0.16) 
 3rd Health Risk Quartile 
 
-0.01 -0.05 0.14 0.06 
 
0.19 0.16 0.16 0.14 
  
(0.13) (0.14) (0.19) (0.21) 
 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.16) (0.16) 
 4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
 
0.23* 0.16 0.23 0.15 
 
0.45*** 0.44** 0.33* 0.32* 
  
(0.12) (0.13) (0.16) (0.15) 
 
(0.17) (0.18) (0.17) (0.18) 
Primary Care Clinic Performance 
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  Clinical Quality (per 1 percentage point) 
  
-0.02 
 
-0.02 
  
-0.01 
 
-0.01 
   
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
 Behavioral Quality  (per 1 percentage point) 
  
0.04 
 
0.04 
  
-0.01 
 
-0.00 
   
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) 
  
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) 
Year Effects (Reference = Year 2009) 
            Year 2010 
 
0.37** 0.30 0.35* 0.29 
 
0.08 0.36* 0.08 0.34 
  
(0.18) (0.22) (0.18) (0.22) 
 
(0.12) (0.22) (0.12) (0.21) 
 Year 2011 
 
0.34* 0.29 0.33* 0.28 
 
0.12 0.38* 0.13 0.37* 
  
(0.18) (0.23) (0.18) (0.23) 
 
(0.14) (0.21) (0.13) (0.21) 
 Year 2012 
 
0.69* 0.49* 0.70* 0.50* 
 
-0.01 0.17 -0.01 0.16 
  
(0.38) (0.29) (0.38) (0.29) 
 
(0.12) (0.19) (0.12) (0.19) 
Pre-intervention Treatment Group-Year Interactions 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 
 
-0.43 -0.32 -0.17 -0.02 
 
0.08 -0.09 0.20 0.16 
  
(0.26) (0.27) (0.36) (0.37) 
 
(0.15) (0.20) (0.23) (0.25) 
 Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 
 
-0.30 -0.17 -0.32 -0.25 
 
0.05 -0.15 -0.18 -0.37 
  
(0.28) (0.26) (0.32) (0.33) 
 
(0.16) (0.20) (0.24) (0.26) 
Pre-intervention Treatment Group-Year-Health Risk Quartile Interactions (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
     Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
        
-0.19 
(0.25) 
-0.28 
(0.28) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
-0.74*** 
(0.32) 
-0.80*** 
(0.34) 
   
-0.50** 
(0.23) 
-0.64*** 
(0.24) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2010 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
-0.20 
(0.30) 
-0.26 
(0.30) 
   
0.05 
(0.24) 
-0.10 
(0.25) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    2nd Health Risk Quartile 
        
0.18 
(0.20) 
0.14 
(0.20) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
-0.11 
(0.28) 
-0.03 
(0.29) 
   
0.30 
(0.23) 
0.32 
(0.23) 
            Switched Primary Care Clinic in 2012 * Year 2011 *  
    4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
0.08 
(0.29) 
0.16 
(0.30) 
   
0.36 
(0.24) 
0.37 
(0.24) 
           Constant 
 
8.84*** 7.24*** 8.82*** 7.36*** 
 
6.89*** 8.42*** 6.92*** 8.33*** 
  
(0.34) (1.48) (0.35) (1.52) 
 
(0.19) (1.28) (0.20) (1.24) 
           Enrollee-year Observations 
 
432 403 432 403 
 
906 838 906 838 
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Unique Enrollees    399  355  399  355   872  632  872  632  
Abbreviation: ED, Emergency Department. 
 
Notes: Includes former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either switched 
primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remain in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916). All models 
estimated with generalized linear models using a log link and Gamma variance structure. Table presents coefficients and not marginal 
effects. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered by enrollee.  
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-7 Coefficients for Multinomial Logit Choice Models Predicting Primary Care Clinics Choices 
  
Excluding Patient Experience Measures 
 
Including Patient Experience Measures 
   
Nested Logit 
  
Nested Logit 
  
Conditional 
Logit 
Separate 
HealthPartners 
Branch 
Separate Branch 
for Each Large 
Health System 
 
Conditional 
Logit 
Separate 
HealthPartners 
Branch 
Separate Branch 
for Each Large 
Health System 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
Primary Care Clinic Choice Equation  
       Performance 
          Clinical Quality (per 1 percentage point) 0.03*** 0.02*** -0.01 
 
0.02** 0.01 -0.01 
  
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
 Behavioral Quality (per 1 percentage point) 0.05*** 0.05*** -0.03* 
 
0.07*** 0.09*** 0.03 
  
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
 Getting Care When Needed (per 1 percentage    
  point)  
    
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.02*** 
(0.01) 
-0.01* 
(0.01) 
          Provider Communication (per 1 percentage  
  point)  
    
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
-0.08*** 
(0.02) 
-0.14*** 
(0.02) 
          Courteous and Helpful Staff (per 1  
  percentage point)  
    
0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.01 
(0.01) 
-0.02 
(0.01) 
         Clinic Attributes 
          Number of Physicians (per 10 physicians) 0.002 0.002 -0.056** 
 
0.002 -0.0005 -0.063* 
  
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) 
 
(0.003) (0.0030) (0.003) 
 Percent Specialty Care Physicians (per 1  
  percentage point)  
0.017*** 
(0.001) 
0.017*** 
(0.002) 
0.011*** 
(0.001) 
 
0.019*** 
(0.002) 
0.018*** 
(0.003) 
0.009*** 
(0.002) 
          Percent Female Physicians (per 1 percentage  
  point)  
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.003* 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.001) 
 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.004* 
(0.002) 
0.002 
(0.002) 
          Percent of Patients with Diabetes Enrolled in  
  Medicare (per 1 percentage point)  
-0.054*** 
(0.004) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.040*** 
(0.005) 
 
-0.07*** 
(0.01) 
-0.05*** 
(0.01) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
          Percent of Patients with Diabetes Enrolled in  
  MHCP (per 1 percentage point)  
-0.033*** 
(0.003) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
-0.035*** 
(0.004) 
 
-0.019*** 
(0.005) 
-0.011** 
(0.005) 
-0.03*** 
(0.01) 
          Clinic Located in Hospital 
 
0.27** 0.26** 0.15 
 
0.17 0.19* 0.20* 
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(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) 
 
(0.11) (0.11) (0.12) 
 Distance to Clinic (per 1 mile) 
 
-0.49*** -0.50*** -0.39*** 
 
-0.51*** -0.50*** -0.43*** 
  
(0.01) (0.05) (0.02) 
 
(0.01) (0.05) (0.03) 
         Inclusive Values 
        Joint Significance of Inclusive Values 
Different than 1a  
N/A Yes Yes N/A Yes Yes 
  Allina Health 
   
0.65 
   
0.70 
    
(0.05) 
   
(0.06) 
 Fairview Health Services 
   
0.71 
   
0.76 
    
(0.06) 
   
(0.07) 
 HealthEast Care System 
   
0.90 
   
1.01 
    
(0.10) 
   
(0.12) 
 HealthPartners 
  
1.57 1.31 
  
1.46 1.25 
   
(0.21) (0.19) 
  
(0.20) (0.19) 
 Park Nicollet Health Services 
   
0.84 
   
0.92 
    
(0.11) 
   
(0.12) 
 University of Minnesota Physicians 
  
0.50 
   
0.62 
    
(0.08) 
   
(0.13) 
 Other Health System 
  
1.01 0.75 
  
0.95 0.79 
   
(0.11) (0.07) 
  
(0.10) (0.09) 
Health System Choice Equation (Reference = Other Health System) 
     Allina Health 
          Age 
   
0.03*** 
   
0.03*** 
    
(0.01) 
   
(0.01) 
 Female 
   
0.19 
   
0.21 
    
(0.25) 
   
(0.31) 
 Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
         2nd Health Risk Quartile 
   
0.50 
   
0.72 
    
(0.40) 
   
(0.50) 
   3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
1.02*** 
   
1.35*** 
    
(0.38) 
   
(0.52) 
   4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
0.69 
   
0.54 
    
(0.42) 
   
(0.51) 
Fairview Health Services 
          Age 
   
0.03*** 
   
0.03*** 
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(0.01) 
   
(0.01) 
 Female 
   
0.31 
   
0.37 
    
(0.25) 
   
(0.32) 
 Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
         2nd Health Risk Quartile 
   
0.03 
   
0.16 
    
(0.42) 
   
(0.51) 
   3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
0.67* 
   
1.00* 
    
(0.40) 
   
(0.53) 
   4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
0.75* 
   
0.60 
    
(0.43) 
   
(0.51) 
HealthEast Care System 
          Age 
   
0.02*** 
   
0.03** 
    
(0.01) 
   
(0.01) 
 Female 
   
-0.03 
   
0.02 
    
(0.30) 
   
(0.36) 
 Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
         2nd Health Risk Quartile 
   
-0.23 
   
0.02 
    
(0.49) 
   
(0.58) 
   3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
-0.06 
   
0.41 
    
(0.47) 
   
(0.59) 
   4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
0.36 
   
0.27 
    
(0.49) 
   
(0.58) 
HealthPartners 
          Age 
  
-0.004 0.01 
  
0.0002 0.03*** 
   
(0.007) (0.01) 
  
(0.0078) (0.01) 
 Female 
  
-0.03 0.08 
  
0.05 0.24 
   
(0.22) (0.29) 
  
(0.22) (0.35) 
 Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
         2nd Health Risk Quartile 
  
0.76* 0.87* 
  
0.75* 1.12* 
   
(0.41) (0.49) 
  
(0.42) (0.58) 
   3rd Health Risk Quartile 
  
0.28 0.76 
  
0.29 1.20* 
   
(0.41) (0.48) 
  
(0.42) (0.61) 
   4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
  
0.79* 1.25** 
  
0.78* 1.17** 
   
(0.41) (0.50) 
  
(0.43) (0.59) 
Park Nicollet Health Services 
          Age 
   
0.03*** 
   
0.03*** 
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(0.01) 
   
(0.01) 
 Female 
   
0.21 
   
0.10 
    
(0.30) 
   
(0.36) 
 Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
         2nd Health Risk Quartile 
   
0.36 
   
0.43 
    
(0.51) 
   
(0.59) 
   3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
0.50 
   
0.83 
    
(0.50) 
   
(0.61) 
   4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
0.62 
   
0.40 
    
(0.53) 
   
(0.60) 
University of Minnesota Physicians 
         Age 
   
0.03*** 
   
0.04*** 
    
(0.01) 
   
(0.01) 
 Female 
   
0.07 
   
0.01 
    
(0.30) 
   
(0.37) 
 Health Risk Quartile (Reference = 1st Quartile (Healthiest)) 
         2nd Health Risk Quartile 
   
1.26** 
   
1.42** 
    
(0.51) 
   
(0.61) 
   3rd Health Risk Quartile 
   
0.81 
   
0.95 
    
(0.51) 
   
(0.64) 
   4th Health Risk Quartile (Sickest) 
   
0.75 
   
0.64 
    
(0.56) 
   
(0.64) 
         Enrollees  988 988 988   908 908 908 
Abbreviation: MHCP, Minnesota Health Care Programs. 
 
a Joint significance of inclusive values tested using a likelihood ratio test. For all nested logit models, the inclusive values were jointly 
signficiant different than 1 (p-value <0.05). 
 
Notes: Includes 988 UPlan enrollees who enrolled in the Medica Elect/Essential plan in 2012 and whose previous primary care clinic 
is excluded in the Medica Elect/Essential plan. Enrollees assigned to primary care clinics that did not report to Minnesota Community 
Measurement (N=82) and enrollees assigned to primary care clinics outside their market area (N=81) are excluded. Primary care 
clinics assigned by pluraity of primary care outpatient evaluation and management visits. Only primary care clinics reported to 
Minnesota Communinity Measrument included. An urban (rural) enrollee’s market area is defined as 12.5-mile (17.5-mile) radius 
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from the center of their zip code of residence. Table presents coefficients and not marginal effects. All performance measures 
calculated from Minnesota Community Measurement publicly reported data. Clinical and Behavioral Quality represent the percent of 
patients meeting treatment goals for diabetes and vascular disease care. Getting Care When Needed, Provider Communication, 
Courteous and Helpful Staff, and Overall Provider Rating measures calculated from survey responses and represent the percent of 
patients giving the clinic the most favorable rating. Full descriptions of these measures are available in Section 4.2. The specific 
patient experience questions asked of survey respondents are avabile in Table A-5. 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6-8 Primary Care Clinic Choice Probability Elasticity with Respect to Clinic Attributes by Health System 
 
  
Allina 
Health 
Fairview 
Health 
Services 
HealthEast 
Care System HealthPartners 
Park Nicollet 
Health 
Services 
University of 
Minnesota 
Physicians 
Other 
Health 
System 
Performance 
          Clinical Quality  
 
-0.52 -0.50 -0.50 -0.56 -0.54 -0.37 -0.51 
  
       
  Behavioral Quality  
 
2.90 2.88 2.97 3.10 2.93 2.50 2.94 
  
       
  Getting Care When Needed  
 
-0.52* -0.52* -0.55* -0.59* -0.57* -0.44* -0.54* 
  
       
  Provider Communication  
 
-12.3*** -12.2*** -12.7*** -13.6*** -12.1*** -10.7*** -12.6*** 
  
       
  Courteous and Helpful Staff 
 
-1.63 -1.59 -1.68 -1.80 -1.63 -1.41 -1.64 
         
Clinic Attributes 
 
       
  Distance to Clinic    -3.59*** -3.56*** -3.41*** -3.70*** -3.74*** -2.95*** -3.66*** 
         
  Number of Physicians   -0.04* -0.02* -0.01* -0.01* -0.03* -0.07* -0.01* 
         
  Percent Specialty Physicians   0.32*** 0.25*** 0.22*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.24*** 0.14*** 
         
  Percent Female Physicians   0.12 0.12 0.12 0.13 0.12 0.10 0.12 
         
  Percent of Patients with Diabetes  
  Enrolled in Medicare   
-1.17*** -1.08*** -1.16*** -0.92*** -1.07*** -0.95*** -1.22*** 
  
       
 Percent of Patients with Diabetes  
  Enrolled in MHCP   
-0.59*** -0.42*** -0.74*** -0.35*** -0.41*** -0.71*** -0.47** 
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Abbreviations: MHCP, Minnesota Health Care Programs. 
 
Notes: Average elasticity calculated over UPlan enrollees observed characteristics. Includes UPlan enrollees who enrolled in the 
Medica Elect/Essential plan in 2012 and whose previous primary care clinic is excluded in the Medica Elect/Essential plan (N = 988). 
All performance measures calculated from Minnesota Community Measurement publicly reported data. Clinical and Behavioral 
Quality represent the percent of patients meeting treatment goals for diabetes and vascular disease care. Getting Care When Needed, 
Provider Communication, Courteous and Helpful Staff, and Overall Provider Rating measures calculated from survey responses and 
represent the percent of patients giving the clinic the most favorable rating. Full descriptions of these measures are available in 
Section 4.2. The specific patient experience questions asked of survey respondents are avabile in Table A-5. 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 3-1 2012 Health Plan Choices of Former HealthPartners Plan Enrollees 
 
HealthPartners (N = 9,452) 
Full network of clinics 
 
Mean Health Risk Score = 1.13 
Switched to New Primary Care Clinic Due 
to HealthPartners Exclusions (N= 1,151) 
Mean Health Risk Score = 1.19 
Medica Elect/Essential (N = 5,194) 
Excluded 18 of 26 HealthPartners primary 
care clinics and all specialty clinics 
(except eye clinics). 
  
Mean Health Risk Score = 1.01 
 
Medica Choice Insights (N = 3,891) 
Included all HealthPartners providers 
 
Mean Health Risk Score = 1.28 
 
Medica Choice Regional (N = 113)/ 
Medica Choice National (N = 108)/ 
Medica Health Savings Account (N =56) 
Excluded 14 of 26 HealthPartners primary 
care clinics and all behavioral health 
clinics. 
 
Mean Health Risk Score Risk = 1.11 
 
2011 Health Plan 2012 Health Plan 
Switched to New Primary Care Clinic Due 
to HealthPartners Exclusions (N= 67) 
Mean Health Risk Score = 0.78 
No Involuntary Primary Care Clinic 
Switches Because HealthPartners is 
Included 
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Notes: The sample of former HealthPartners plan enrollees included adults enrolled in the HealthPartners plan in 2011 and who were 
identified in both the 2011 and 2012 UPlan eligibility files. Approximately an additional 2,000 previous HealthPartners plan enrollees 
were excluded due to an inability to crosswalk 2011 individual identifiers with 2012 individual identifiers in the UPlan medical claims 
and eligibility files after the UPlan changed claim processers in 2012. 
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Figure 3-2 Distribution of Performance for Primary Care Clinics in the Twin Cities, 2012 
(A) Clinical Quality 
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(B) Behavioral Quality 
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(C) Getting Care When Needed 
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(D) Provider Communication 
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(E) Courteous and Helpful Staff 
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(F) Overall Provider Rating 
 
Notes: Includes primary care clinics reporting to Minnesota Community Measurement. The Twin Cities area included Anoka, Dakota, 
Hennepin, Ramsey, and Washington counties. All performance measures calculated from Minnesota Community Measurement 
publicly reported data. Clinical and behavioral quality represent the percent of patients meeting treatment goals for diabetes and 
vascular disease care. Getting Care When Needed, Provider Communication, Courteous and Helpful Staff, and Overall Provider 
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Rating measures calculated from survey responses and represent the percent of patients giving the clinic the most positive rating. Full 
descriptions of these measures are available in Section 4.2. The specific patient experience questions asked of survey respondents are 
avabile in Table A-5. 
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Figure 5-1 UPlan Enrollees Included in Analysis 
 
HealthPartners (N = 9,452) 
Full network of clinics 
 
Mean Health Risk Score = 1.13 
Switched to New Primary Care Clinic Due to HealthPartners 
Exclusions (N= 1,151) 
 
Treatment Group 
 
Mean Health Risk Score = 1.19 
Remained in Same Non-Excluded Primary Care Clinic (N = 916) 
 
Control Group 
 
Mean Health Risk Score = 1.30 
Medica Elect/Essential (N = 5,194) 
Excluded 18 of 26 HealthPartners primary 
care clinics and all specialty clinics (except 
eye clinics) 
  
Mean Health Risk Score = 1.01 
Medica Choice Insights (N = 3,891) 
Included all HealthPartners providers 
 
Mean Health Risk Score = 1.28 
 
Other Medica Plan (N = 277) 
Excluded 14 of 26 HealthPartners primary 
care clinics and all behavioral health 
clinics 
 
Mean Health Risk Score Risk = 1.11 
Other (N = 3,127) 
-Voluntarily Switched Non-excluded Clinics ( N = 651) 
-No Primary Care in 2011 or 2012 (N = 1,737) 
-Could Not Determine Primary Care Clinic in 2011 or 2012 (N = 737) 
 
Mean Health Risk Score = 0.90 
2011 Health Plan 2012 Health Plan 
All boxes represent UPlan enrollees excluded from the analysis. 
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Notes: The sample of former HealthPartners plan enrollees included adults enrolled in the HealthPartners plan in 2011 and who were 
identified in both the 2011 and 2012 UPlan eligibility files. Approximately 2,000 previous HealthPartners plan enrollees are excluded 
due to an inability to crosswalk 2012 individual identifiers to 2011 individual identifiers in the UPlan medical claims and eligibility 
files after the UPlan changed claim processers in 2012. 
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Figure 5-2 Expenditures for New 2012 Medica Elect/Essential Enrollees, 2008 through 2012 
(A) Total Expenditures 	
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* Significant difference (p-value < 0.1) in growth of 
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(B) Non-Emergency Department Outpatient Expenditures 	
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(C) Prescription Drug Expenditures 	
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(D) Hospital Inpatient Expenditures 	
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(E) Emergency Department Expenditures 	
 
Abbreviation: ED, Emergency Department. 
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Notes: Includes 2,067 former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either 
switched primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remain in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916). All 
expenditures are adjusted to 2012 dollars and include plan payments and out-of-pocket costs. 
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Figure 5-3 Utilization for New 2012 Medica Elect/Essential Enrollees, 2008 through 2012 
(A) Percent of Enrollees with a Hospitalization 	
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(B) Percent of Enrollees with an Emergency Department Visit 	
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(C) Visits with Primary Care Providers 	
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(D) Visits with Specialty Care Providers 	
 
Notes: Includes 2,067 former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either 
switched primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remain in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916).  
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Figure 6-1 Adjusted Changes in Percent of Enrollees with a Hospitalization and Percent of Enrollees with an Emergency Department 
Visit After Switching Primary Care Clinics 
 
Notes: Includes 2,067 former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either 
switched primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remain in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916). Table 
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presents average marginal effects from the difference-in-differences probit regressions presented in Table 6-1 including health system 
effects and primary care clinic performance. Marginal effect of switching primary care clinics on the probability of having a 
hospitalization for health risk Quartile 1 could not be estimated because no enrollees who switched clinics in Quartile 1 had a 
hospitalization in 2012. Standard errors to determine significance clustered by enrollee. 
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Figure 6-2 Adjusted Changes in the Number of Visits with Primary Care and Specialty Care Providers After Switching Primary Care 
Clinics 
Notes: Includes 2,067 former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either 
switched primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remain in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916). Table 
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presents marginal effects at the means from the difference-in-differences negative binomial regressions presented in Table 6-2 
including health system effects and primary care clinic performance. Standard errors to determine significance clustered by enrollee. 
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Figure 6-3 Difference in Visits with Primary Care Providers per Enrollee from Previous Year by Month, Enrollees in the Sickest 
Health Risk Quartile  
 
Notes: Includes former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012, who were in the sickest 
health risk quartile, and who either switched primary care clinics due to network restrictions (N = 314) or did not switch clinics (N = 
266). 
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Figure 6-4 Difference in Visits with Specialty Care Providers per Enrollee from Previous Year by Month, Enrollees in the Three 
Sickest Health Risk Quartiles  
 
Notes: Includes former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012, who were in the three 
sickest health risk quartile, and who either switched primary care clinics due to network restrictions (N = 823) or did not switch clinics 
(N = 664). 
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Figure 6-5 Adjusted Changes in Total, Non-Emergency Department Outpatient, and Prescription Drug Expenditures After Switching 
Primary Care Clinics 
 
Abbreviations: ED, Emergency Department. 
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Notes: Includes 2,067 former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either 
switched primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remain in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916). Table 
presents marginal effects at the means from the difference-in-difference generalized linear model regressions presented in Table 6-4 
and Table 6-5 including health system effects and primary care clinic performance. Standard errors to determine significance 
clustered by enrollee. 
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Figure 6-6 Adjusted Changes in Hospital Inpatient and Emergency Department Expenditures After Switching Primary Care Clinics 
 
Abbreviations: ED, Emergency Department. 
 
Notes: Includes 2,067 former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who either 
switched primary care clinics due to network restriction (N = 1,151) or who remain in the same non-excluded clinic (N = 916). Table 
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presents marginal effects at the means unconditional on utilization. Marginal effects calculated from two-part model utilizing the 
difference-in-difference probit regressions presented in Table 6-1 and the generalized linear models presented in Table 6-6 that 
include health system effects and primary care clinic performance. Marginal effect of switching primary care clinics on the probability 
of having a hospitalization for health risk Quartile 1 could not be estimated because no enrollees who switched clinics in Quartile 1 
had a hospitalization in 2012. Standard errors to determine significance bootstrapped (200 iterations). 
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Figure 6-7 Clinical and Behavioral Performance of Enrollee’s New Primary Care Clinics Relative to Their Previous Clinics 
Notes: Includes 1,068 former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who switched to 
a primary care clinic reporting to Minnesota Community Measurement in 2012. All performance measures calculated from Minnesota 
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Community Measurement publicly reported data. Clinical and behavioral quality represent the percent of patients meeting treatment 
goals for diabetes and vascular disease care. Full descriptions of these measures are available in Section 4.2.  
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Figure 6-8 Patient Experience Performance of Enrollee’s New Primary Care Clinics Relative to Their Previous Clinics 
 
Notes: Includes 977 former adult HealthPartners plan enrollees who enrolled in Medica Elect/Essential in 2012 and who switched to a 
primary care clinic reporting to Minnesota Community Measurement in 2012. All performance measures calculated from Minnesota 
Community Measurement publicly reported data. Getting Care When Needed, Provider Communication, Courteous and Helpful Staff, 
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and Overall Provider Rating measures calculated from survey responses and represent the percent of patients giving the clinic the most 
positive rating. Full descriptions of these measures are available in Section 4.2. The specific patient experience questions asked of 
survey respondents are avabile in Table A-5. 
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Table A-1 HealthPartners Providers Included in Medica Plans Offered by the University of Minnesota UPlan 
  
Medica Health Plan 
Location 
 
Choice Insightsa Elect/Essential 
Choice Regional/  
Choice National/  
Health Savings Account 
Primary Care Clinics 
    Adult Seniors Health (St. Paul) 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Andover 
 
Included Included Included 
Anoka 
 
Included Included Included 
Apple Valley 
 
Included 
  Arden Hills 
 
Included 
  Bloomington 
 
Included 
  Brooklyn Center 
 
Included 
  Center for International Health (St. Paul)  Included  Included 
Collegeville (St. Cloud) 
 
Included 
  Como 
 
Included 
  Coon Rapids 
 
Included Included Included 
Cottage Grove 
 
Included 
  Elk River 
 
Included Included Included 
Health Center for Women (St. Paul) 
 
Included Included Included 
Inver Grove Heights 
 
Included 
  Lino Lakes 
 
Included Included Included 
Maplewood 
 
Included 
  Midway 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Regions Hospital Primary Care (St. Paul)  Included Included Included 
Riverside (Minneapolis) 
 
Included 
  Roseville 
 
Included Included Included 
Sartell (St. Cloud) 
 
Included 
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St. Paul-Wabasha Street 
 
Included 
  West (St. Louis Park) 
 
Included 
  White Bear Lake 
 
Included 
  Woodbury 
 
Included 
 
Included 
     Specialty Clinics 
    Arden Wood Eye Clinic 
 
Included Included Included 
Maplewood Behavioral Health 
 
Included 
  St. Paul Behavioral Health 
 
Included 
  Woodbury Behavioral Health 
 
Included 
  Bloomington Eye Clinic 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Como Eye Clinic 
 
Included Included Included 
HealthPartners Specialty Center (St. Paul) 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Sleep Health Center (Maplewood) 
 
Included 
 
Included 
Parkway (Robbinsdale) 
 
Included 
  Regions Alcohol & Drug Program (St. Paul) 
 
Included 
Regions Rehabilitation Institute (St. Paul) 
 
Included   
Regions Specialty Clinics (St. Paul) 
 
Included 
 
Included 
West Eye Clinic (St. Louis Park) 
 
Included Included Included 
Woodbury Eye Clinic 
 
Included 
 
Included 
     Hospital 
    Regions Hospital 
 
Included Included Included 
     Other 
 
All providers included 
 
Urgent care included at 
clinics except Cottage Grove 
   
    
All plastic surgeons included 
a Medica Choice Insights is a tiered health plan with different copayments by tier. All HealthPartners providers were included in Tier 
1, which is the cheapest tier. 
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Table A-2 Place of Service Codes for Outpatient and Inpatient Utilization 
2008 Through 2011 Claims   2012 Claims 
Code Place of Service 
 
Codea Place of Service 
Outpatient 
   0 Unknown 
 
1 Pharmacy 
2 Hospital Outpatient 
 
11 Office 
5 Ambulatory Surgical Center-Hospital  
 
12 Home 
6 Ambulatory Surgical Center-Free Standing 
Facility 
 
20 Urgency Care Facility 
9 Other Physicians Office 
 
22 On Campus-Hospital Outpatient 
10 Patients Home 
 
23 Emergency Room-Hospital 
11 Independent Lab 
 
24 Ambulatory Surgical Center 
12 Emergency Treatment Center 
 
25 Birthing Center 
14 Birthing Center 
 
26 Military Treatment Facility 
15 Clinic 
 
33 Custodial Care Facility 
16 Psychiatrist/Psychologist Office 
 
34 Hospital 
17 Chiropractors Office 
 
41 Ambulance-Land 
18 Podiatrist Office 
 
42 Ambulance-Air or Water 
19 Pharmacy 
 
50 Federal Qualified Health Center 
20 OB/GYN 
 
53 Community Mental Health Center 
21 Hospital Emergency Room 
 
60 Mass Immunization Center 
22 Nursing Home 62 Comprehensive Outpatient-Rehabilitation 
Facility 
24 Dentist Office 
 
65 End-Stage Renal Disease Treatment Facility 
25 Psychiatric Facility- Outpatient 
 
71 Public Health Clinic 
26 Drug Alcohol Treatment-Outpatient 
 
72 Rural Health Clinic 
27 Medical Rehabilitation-Outpatient 
 
81 Independent Laboratory 
28 Residential Treatment Center 
 
95 Unknown 
98 Other 
 
99 Other Place of Service 
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Inpatient 
   1 Hospital Inpatient   21 Hospital Inpatient 
aPlace of service codes from 2012 correspond to CMS place of service codes. 
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Table A-3 Provider Specialty Codes for Outpatient Evaluation and Management Visits 
     2008 Through 2011 Claims   2012 Claims 
Claim Code Specialty 
 
Claim Code Specialty 
Primary Care 
    1 Family Practice 
 
200 Internal Medicine 
2 General Preventive Medicine 
 
240 Family Practice 
4 Nurse Practitionera 
 
320 Obstetrics/Gynecology 
7 Physician Assistanta 
 
853 Registered Nursea 
21 Internal Medicine 
   256 Obstetrics/Gynecology 
   
     
     Specialty Care 
    All Others Codes All Others Specialties   All Others Codes All Others Specialties 
a Nurse practitioners, physicians assistants, registered nurse, and any other non-physicians determined to be working at specialty care 
clinics where coded as specialists. 
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Table A-4 Common Procedural Terminology and UB-04 Revenue Codes for Outpatient Evaluation and Management Visits and 
Emergency Department Visits 
Outpatient Evaluation and Management Visit Codes 
 
Emergency Department Visit Codes 
New Patient Office Visit 
 
Common	Procedural	Terminology Codes 
99201 
 
99281 
99202 
 
99282 
99203 
 
99283 
99204 
 
99824 
99205 
 
99825 
   Established Patient Office Visit 
 
UB-04 Revenue Codes 
99211 
 
0450 
99212 
 
0451 
99213 
 
0452 
99214 
 
0456 
99215 
 
0459 
  
0981 
New Patient Preventive Medicine Visit 
  99381 
  99382 
  99383 
  99385 
  99384 
  99386 
  99387 
  
   Established Preventive Medicine Visit 
  99391 
  99392 
  99393 
  99394 
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99395 
  99396 
  99397 
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Table A-5 Minnesota Community Measurement Patient Experience Survey Tool Questions 
Patient Experience Domain Questions 
Getting Care When Needed 
 
In the last 12 months, when you phoned this provider’s office to get an appointment for care you 
needed right away, how often did you get an appointment as soon as you needed? 
 In the last 12 months, when you made an appointment for a checkup or routine care with this 
provider, how often did you get an appointment as soon as you needed?  
 In the last 12 months, when you phoned this provider’s office during regular office hours, how 
often did you get an answer to your medical question that same day?  
 In the last 12 months, when you phoned this provider’s office after regular office hours, how 
often did you get an answer to your medical question as soon as you needed?  
 Wait time includes time spent in the waiting room and exam room. In the last 12 months, how 
often did you see this provider within 15 minutes of your appointment time?  
  
Provider Communication  
 
In the last 12 months, how often did this provider explain things in a way that was easy to 
understand?  
 In the last 12 months, how often did this provider listen carefully to you?  
 In the last 12 months, how often did this provider give you easy to understand information about 
these health questions or concerns?  
 In the last 12 months, how often did this provider seem to know the important information about 
your medical history?  
 In the last 12 months, how often did this provider show respect for what you had to say? 
 In the last 12 months, how often did this provider spend enough time with you?  
  
Courteous and Helpful Staff  
 
In the last 12 months, how often were clerks and receptionists at this provider’s office as helpful 
as you thought they should be?  
 In the last 12 months, how often did clerks and receptionists at this provider’s office treat you 
with Courteous and respect? 
  
Overall Provider Rating  
 
Using any number from 0 to 10, where 0 is the worst provider possible and 10 is the best 
provider possible, what number would you use to rate this provider? 
Notes: All questions are from the Consumer Assessment of Healthcare Providers and Systems Clinician & Group 12-Month Survey. 
